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CH/lPTER I 
Introduction 
"There can hardly he any doubt that if Germany 
were to shift the focal point of her strategy 
to the Mediterranean, she would have had to 
solve this task in a military sense." 
Field Marshal 
Erich von Manstein 
I 
German-Spanish relations for the century or more 
before 1936 by and large constitute a history of co-opera­
tion. Various German and Spanish governments have stood 
side by side against Republican France and Napoleon, and 
in 1822 at Verona it was Prussia who helped to CGmmissioa 
France to restore Ferdinand VII's power as the Spanish 
monarch. In 1868 Leopold of Hohenzollern's consideration 
and refusal of the Spanish crown was a trifling incident 
that bore amazing results. During the Cantonal Wars (1873), 
it was Germany that sent the first battleship to crush rebel 
Spanish naval vessels, and Bisfflarck himself tried a campaign 
to influence public opinion by damning the Carlists and 
their methods of warfare. 
The first serious German-Spanish dispute in recent 
times came in 1885 when Germany occupied some of the Caroline 
Islands. Although the Spanish press boasted of Spanish 
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military might—an army "equal in every respect to Meltke's 
1 
helmeted legions" —the only result was an attack by an 
irate mob on the German embassy in Madrid. The Germans fin­
ally left the Carolines, and amiable relations were restored. 
In World War I, the Spanish government, especially 
the more conservative element, was not so much pro-German as 
anti-French. But the king and the liberals favored the 
Entente, and Spain remained neutral despite the fact that 
England held Gibralter, something the Spanish have never for­
gotten. Although German commercial competition with England 
for Spanish markets had been welcomed as beneficial to the 
country, the pro-Entente feeling was a matter of political 
principle because of the liberal types of government in 
England and France. In larger measure, however, the Spanish 
point of view was probably due to a certain practical, materi­
alistic trait often seen in the Spanish character. For as 
Spaniards have pointed out, it would have been fatal for 
Spain to have sided with Germany in World War I, since her 
wide separation from the latter, coupled with British naval 
supremacy, would have made it unlikely that Germany could 
2 
have been of any assistance to Spain. 
But it was after World War I that the cordial rela­
tionship between Spain and Germany grew to its fullest. In 
1 
G. P. White, A Century of Spain and Portugal 
(London: Methuen, 1909X, p. 321, 
p 
Charles E. Chapman, A History of Spain (New York: 
Macmillan, 1948), p. 514. 
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1927-28, the German navy ohtained the blessings of the Span­
ish king and his dictatorial prime minister, Primo d© Rivera, 
and began in Spain the construction of a U-boat of new design. 
The vessel was built according to the specifications of the 
German naval ministry, and there were many German technicians 
on hand. This project, of course, was in violation of the 
Versailles Treaty. Completed in 1931, the U-boat was built 
in the Eche Varietta shipyard in C^diz and became the pilot 
3 
model for the U-25 and U-26 class boat. 
And it was the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39 that set 
the tone of German-Spanish relations during the first year 
or two of the Second World War. On July 18, 1936, strong 
elements of the Spanish Right rose against the newly founded 
republic. The rebels expected to occupy the whole of Spain, 
e*cept perhaps for Barcelona and Madrid, within a few days. 
They had at their disposal the greater part of the armed 
forces of the country and were backed by a strong political 
party and a great part of the Church. But the rebels were 
isappointed. The country divided itself into twp armed 
camps—the Loyalist government in the south and the Nationa­
list rebels in the north. In the bitter fighting that 
followed, the German Luftwaffe made possible the first gains 
^Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prose­
cution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. 
Supp. A (Washington D. C.; United States Government Printing 
Office, 1947), p. 977. 
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of the Nationalists by transporting their leader and reserves 
over the guns of Loyalist naval forces lying in wait in the 
4 
Strait of Gibraltar, After their failure to bring down the 
republic with a quick coup« the Spanish Nationalists had 
appealed to Berlin to aid their cause just as they had 
aided Germany in years past. Hitler sent the Junkers-52s' 
to Spanish Morocco, and gave the rebellion in Spain a new 
lease on life. 
The first German infantry to arrive in Spain reached 
Cadiz on or about November 7, 1936, General Sperrle, the 
commander of the Luftwaffe Condor Legion in Spain, wrote in 
Die Wehrmacht of Jlay, 1939, that 6,500 German troops landed 
5 
in November, 1936. Before that, about 5,000 other volun­
teers of a "non-military" nature had arrived. Technicians 
and artillery were sent to the Nationalists via Portugal, 
and in Hamburg there was a dock that became known to the 
6 
local citizens as "France wharf," 
Although German aid continued throughout most of 
the civil war (it was reduced by Berlin in early 1939), 
its need was most keenly felt and its arrival most highly 
appreciated during those crucial months of the summer and 
4 
Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth (New York; 
Macmillan, 1943), p. 316» 
5 
P, A, M, van der Esch, Prelude to gar (The Hague; 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1951), p. 38, 
^Ibid.. 36. 
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fall of 1936. In the middle of November, Hitler sent one 
combat group (3 squadrons of Junkers-52), a fighter group 
(3 squadrons of Heinkel-5l), a company of radio operators, 
a company of telegraphists, a company of "listeners," and 
a meteorologist unit, as well as the thousands of infantry 
troops mentioned above. The German Condor Legion (Luft­
waffe), commanded at different times by Generals Sperrle, 
Volkmann, and von Richthefen, did yeoman service against 
the Loyalists. So proud was Hitler of his forces in Spain 
that he had nothing but praise for a German film, completed 
at the cost of several million marks, based on the exploits 
8 
of the famous Condor Legion. 
The civil war ended at 10:00 p.m., March 26, 1939. 
The rebels had won. And no mean share of that victory was 
due to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Shortly before, in 
February, the Nationalist government had concluded a cultural 
agreement (see below) with the Third Reich.^ This, and the 
Spanish adhesion to the Anti-Comintern Pact (see below), 
were the only two tangible agreements that held Spain in 
bond to the Nazis. The Spaniards chose to ignore the debt 
owed the Reich for war aid, and most of the feeling of 
Claude G. Bowers, Mission to Spain (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 259. 
^Ibid., 2.60, . 
Q 
"Resume of the Cultural Agreement Between Germany 
and Nationalist (insurgent) Spain," School and Society. 
February 4, 1939, p. 150. 
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"fascist brotherhood" existed in the hearts of Hitler and 
Mussolini, General Franco, the new ruler of Spain, was 
grateful, but fiercely independent. His attitude was not 
to change, nor to be changed, 
II 
Gurse Complete de Primera Ense^anza. the standard 
elementary school textbook used today throughout Spain, 
defines the present Spanish regime as; 
The Spanish State, born under the unity and 
greatness of the Fatherland, is a totalitarian 
instrument at the service of the Fatherland; 
National-Syndicalist in character in everything 
which signifies a reaction against liberal 
capitalism and Marxist materialism.^® 
By the end of June, 1940 (after the fall of France), this 
"totalitarian instrument" institutionally resembled the Third 
Reich. Much as in the German scheme of things, Franco and the 
Spanish government were indistinguishable. Franco in Spain, 
as Hitler in Germany, was Commander-in-Chief of the Armed 
Forces, Chief of the government, Leader of the only legal 
party, and Head of the State. His parliament, the Cortes, 
enjoyed only one dubious right; the approval of his decrees, 
if he submitted them for approval. Other apparent similari­
ties can be noted between the two regimes. Germany had the 
Gestapo, Spain the Falangist Direccion General de Seguridad; 
Germany had the SA and the SS, Spain the Militia Armada, 
l^Emmet John Hughes, Report From Spain (New York; 
Henry Holt, 1947), p. 3. 
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Germany's attitude toward Spain as of the end of June, 
1940, was one of benevolence. The Reich, of course, looked 
upon Falangist Spain as a fledgling member of the association 
of World Leaders—a member of the New Order. But more prac­
tically, Germany knew that Spain possessed qualities benefi­
cial to Germany's war plans. First of all, Spain's strategic 
location was noted by Hitler himself when he observed that 
the Luftwaffe's attempt to block the Sicily passage from the 
air was but a poor substitute for the possession of Gibraltar, 
If Germany could have held the "Rock," she would have been in 
a position to gain a foothold in North Africa and to close 
11 
the western Mediterranean to the British fleet. The German 
navy's interest in Spain stemmed from a desire to have 
Atlantic bases farther from the RAF's reach than those at 
12 
Brest or Cherbourg, while the Canary Islands were ideal as 
bases—both naval and air—for submarine and surface fleets 
as well as for the Luftwaffe. 
A second practical reason for Germany's interest 
was one of population. The Spanish people numbered over 
25,000,000 possible allies, workers, soldiers, and if 
^^Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. VI, 442. 
12 
Generaloberst Franz Haider, The Private War 
Journal of Generaloberst Franz Haider (Chief of the General 
Staff of the Supreme Command of the German Army. 1939-1942). 
(Released by the Office of the Chief Historian, Headquarters 
European Command: United States Army, 1950), Vol. V, p. 19, 
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necessary, slaves. In the third place, the armed forces of 
Spain (although not modern) were reasonably large and were 
certainly battle trained and tested. The regular Spanish 
army numbered, according to German estimates, 250,000 in 
13 
peacetime, and 500,000 could be mustered. Hitler himself 
held the Spanish soldier in high esteem. When speaking of 
the troops of the "Blue Division" which fought with the 
ffehrmacht on the Eastern Front in 1942-43, he said: 
To (German) troops the Spaniards are a crew 
of ragamuffins. They regard a rifle as an 
instrument that should not be cleaned under 
any pretext. Their sentries exist in prin­
ciple only. They don't take up their posts, 
or if they do take tiiem up, they do so in 
their sleep, ihen the Russians arrive, the 
natives have to wake them up. But the 
Spaniards have never yielded an inch of 
ground. One can't imagine more fearless 
fellows. They scarcely take cover. They 
flout death. I know, in any case, that our 
men are always glad to have Spaniards as 
neighbors in their sector. 
The fall of France gave to Spain yet another quality 
in the eyes of the Germans, Spain possessed coal, iron, 
copper, and especially tungsten—and with France occupied, 
a direct transportation route to the interior of the fieich 
lay waiting and ready. Germany could make good use of that 
tungsten, as well as the other natural resources of Spain. 
And lastly, Spain was led by men who were fascists, or at 
least appeared to be such in both London and Berlin, As far 
^^Halder, V, 3«. 
14 
A^olf Hitler, Hitler's Secret Conversations (here­
after referred to as The Table Talks},edited by H, R, Trevor-
Roper (New Yorkr Parrar, Straus and Young, 1953), p. 148, 
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as the Germans were concerned, the bond of "fascist brother­
hood," the concept of the New Order, made Spain a partner, 
an ally, a comrade in arms. 
But the German evaluation of Spain in that summer of 
1940 ignored, wholly or in part, certain important factors 
that were active upon the Spanish scene. The greatest among 
these was the new ruler of Spain himself. For with the com­
ing of peace in 1939, General Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo 
Teodule Franco Bahamonde commanded the Spanish state. Emmet 
John Hughes, in his work Report From Spain, gives an insight 
into the character of the Caudillo and his government; 
This man is a Gallegan, By tradition these 
men of Spain's northwesternmost corner are 
striking prototypes of the Latin peasant 
character: they are stubborn, they are 
shrewd, they are cautious, they are adroit, 
they are tenacious. These adjectives not 
only apply accurately to the character of 
Spain's dictator, but also illustrate the 
whole nature and temper of his regime: its 
resolute clinging to power, and its sinuous, 
elusive capacity to reconcile the most flag­
rant contradictions, to rationalize the 
grossest inconsistencies, 
Spain, according to Hughes, has always been fond of paradox, 
and this singular quality is the key to the Franoeo regime 
and to the general himself. The Caudillo lacked the mandate 
from the people, he did not possess any such mass personal 
following as to support his exercise of power. In the final 
analysis it was dependent upon an alliance of those old. 
^^Hughes, 5. 
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historic political forces which have always been on the 
Spanish scene—the Church and the army. 
After his first chat with Franco in 1942, Carlton 
Hayes, the American ambassador, related what had transpired; 
What really happened during those fifty 
minutes was a spirited conversation between 
General Franco and myself, with the Baron de 
las Torres interpreting and Sr. Serrano 
Suner sitting mute. The General, I soon 
perceived, differed notably from the carica­
tures of him current in the 'leftist' press 
of the United States, Physically he was not 
so short or so stout and he did not 'strut,' 
Mentally he impressed me as being not at all 
a stupid person, but distinctly alert and 
possessing a good deal of both determination 
and caution and a rather lively and spontaneous 
sense of humor,^ 
Hayes described the general as a professional military man 
and held that like so many others of his calling Franco 
possessed a limited knowledge of the complexities and 
potentialities of the world outside of his own. Also, 
the new ambassador thought he detected a note of admira­
tion— or fear—in the general's discussion of the Wehrmacht, 
Emmet John Hughes wrote that Franco considered himself 
the savior of Spain, the single force that "through God's 
17 
grace and his own zeal'" saved Spain in 1936-39 from 
Communism and atheism. Even if this claim be true, it is 
undeniable that Franco failed to save Spain from the depths 
1 fi 
Carlton J. H. Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain, 
1942-1946 (New York; Macmillan, 1946), p. 30, 
'̂''Hughes, 6. ̂  
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of economic chaos in 1939-40. Although the Third lieich 
had sent tons of war material and thousands of troops and 
planes to aid the Nationalists in the Civil War, Berlin 
had failed to deliver any type of aid needed to secure 
Spain's prosperity after the war. Even as the panzer 
legions of the Wehrmaeht reached the Pyrenees at the end of 
June, 1940, the Spanish people drew ever nearer to starva­
tion. Carlton Hayes noted that by July, 1941, the situation 
had grown so desperate that Secretary Hull explained to 
President Roosevelt that unless something were done to meet 
Spanish fuel requirements a situation would result which 
might have conceivably presented the Germans occupying 
Prance with an excuse for restoring order in Spain, i.e., 
intervention. Food distribution within Spain was completely 
dependent upon transportation, and transportation upon fuel-
Even in 1940-41, German-Spanish trade was not in any volume, 
nor did it involve those commodities (food and fuel) that 
Spain needed so desperately. 
Thus, if the Spaniard eared to think like a fascist, 
he was inexorably bound to British and American trade; 
The Spanish government of General Franco 
thoroughly appreciated the country's cardinal 
need for petroleum and its dependence upon 
the United States for making a supply of 
that commodity available to Spain. ' 
l®Hayes, 80, 
^^Ibid,. 82, 
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The Germans failed, in large part, to recognize the dire 
economic situation of Spain as of June-July 1940. They 
failed to see that the Spanish were dependent on American 
oil. They did not realize that Spain had to obtain her 
20 
rubber and wheat from overseas sources. And Spain her­
self continued to be the neutral—to commit herself in no 
way. Although she was economically dependent upon the 
democracies, as late as 1943 Spain was shipping some iron 
ore to a Germany that could give her none of the vital 
commodities she needed so desperately. General Blumentritt 
noted that ''the convoys brought from Spain the raw materials 
21 
(iron ore) which were lacking at home.'* Spanish reasons 
behind such actions remains hidden in the archives in Madrid, 
But the Spanish charade was well played. After the 
victorious German army had reached the Pyrenees over a fallen 
France in the early summer of 1940 (June 27), there was every 
reason to believe, both in the Allied and Asix worlds, that 
Spain would soon take the logical step in her development as 
a fascist state, that she would join her victorious sister 
states of the New Order in the war of "European unity." 
^^Hayes, 79, 
21 
Guenther B. Blumentritt, Von Rundstedt (London: 
Odhams Press Ltd., 1952), p. 152, 
-la­
in 
When France surrendered on June 25, 1940, the German 
Reich was at the zenith of its power. Spain, on the other 
hand, was a weak and war ravaged Latin state, with less than 
one-third Germany's population and possessing a military force 
that could not have hoped to compete with the seemingly all-
powerful Wehrmacht. In comparing German and Spanish military 
strength as of that year, one finds that in the West the 
Germans possessed a military machine of 165 divisions, with 
an airforee of 57 bomber and dive-bomber groups and 41 fighter 
groups. The Wehrmacht had on hand ten armored divisions, and 
22 ten more were being activated. French, Czech, and Polish 
arms and armor were available, and food stores, oil reserves, 
and ammunition and material depots had been captured. The 
German navy, in that early summer of 1940, held ports 
directly on the ocean at Brest, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Antwerp, 
Bordeaux, and Rotterdam. It had also broken British naval 
ciphers, which gave its submarine and surface fleets an 
advantage above and beyond the new high-seas ports, i.e., 
first hand knowledge of British convoys, their size, cargo, 
23 
speed, protection and destination. Besides France, the 
Wehrmacht occupied half of Poland, all of Belgium, Holland 
"^"^Halder, IV, 82-83. 
^^Peter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion (New York; Simon 
and Schuster, 1957), p. 190. 
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Euxembourg, Czechoslovakia and Norway, and was contemplating 
the invasion and occupation of the British Isles. 
In comparison with their own strength, German esti­
mates of Spanish and Portugese military potential are 
instructive. On November 13, 1940, General Haider noted in 
his War Journal the following report;: 
Spain: Army; 27 divisions of 9,000 peacetime 
strength, each. War strength of army 500,000; 
armament on hand. Lacking AAA (antiaircraft 
artillery). Armor consists of a great variety 
of models, as does aviation. Armanents Industry; 
meets only peacetime requirements. Coastal 
artillery; ammunition stocks very low. Officers 
Corps; severly depleted, 50% were massacred. 
Morocco; border has only field fortifications, 
Ceuta obsolete harbor fortifications— 2-3 
24cm. batteries. Seven divisions (including 
five crack divisions) with full complement 
of divisional artillery regements, plus three 
corps of artillery of six battalions (10 5 cm. 
and 15.5cm.)« Tangier; open roadstead. Can­
ary Islands; little is known about artillery 
defences. No air fnrce^ Rio do Ore; only a 
weak police force. 
On the same day Haider received a report on the other 
Iberian state, Portugal, which would ultimately be greatly 
affected by any Spanish military or political action. 
Haider noted it thus-.: 
Portugal; Army; five weak divisions in the home 
country. Azores; 3 (infantry)-0 (cavalry)-3 
Artillery) and a few 15cm. guns, Madeira; one 
battalion, one btry. Cape Verde Islands; one 
company (completely insufficient). Kaper 
strength of war-time army is 100,000. Time 
needed for mobilization cannot be estimated. 
Army deliberately neglected. Coastline; the 
army Is not in a position to defend the home 
^^alder, V, 19 
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eountry, the islands and the colonies. Inten­
tion to defend them against Britain is at 
least doubtful, Porto and Lisbon are forti­
fied. Obsolete installations, projected 
modernization has not been carried out. No 
officers corps in our sense of the word. 
Officers have part time civilian jobs. Arma­
ment being modernized, but process interrupted 
by war. Armament industry practically non-
existant 
Spanish arms, and more important Spain herself, would 
have benefited the German war machine, but obviously presented 
no danger to the Reich in terms of military prowess or 
ability as of 1940, Spain was both militarily inferior 
to Germany and politically associated, at least in spirit, 
with the Axis. The Reich's superiority in terms of men and 
material, and in terms of military ability, was a fact. If 
Germany cared to force Spain to make a choice, le., alliance 
or occupation, Spain could have expected no aid from allies, 
for she had none, save the Axis themselves and perhaps Fortu-
gal, who might or might not have conceded a "common Iberian 
interest." In 1940, Spain stood with the Axis, or she stood 
alone. The Spanish government, whatever its reasons, stood 
with the Axis. The next step was for Germany and Italy to 
persuade Spain to march with them. 
In the summer and early autumn of 1940, the German 
government attempted to gain two ends in Spainr first, 
Inducing Spain to join the Tri-partite Axis alliance in 
^^Halder, V, 19. 
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the interest of the solidarity of the New Order, and second, 
persuading Spain to become a belligerent, primarily in terms 
of a combined German-Spanish assault on Gibraltar. The 
first goal was all but achieved in 1940. Although Spain had 
not yet become a member of the Axis alliance, Franco had 
joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, and his intentions, 
as far as the Germans were concerned, were what they should 
have been, i.e., tending toward the Axis alliance. As John 
Hughes points out: 
At Burgos, on March 27, 1939, Spain had joined 
the Anti-Comintern Pact, the protocol of 
accession going into effect at once: and the 
German delegate von Stohrer, the Italian 
Gampalti, and the Japanese Makoto Yano felt 
that they could count on Spain in the days 
to Gome.^° 
And Spain did not lag, not yet. 
In early 1940, the German ambassador in Madrid, von 
Stohrer, was able to cable Berlin that the Spanish govern­
ment was prepared to place German tankers in out-of-the-way 
bays of the Spanish coast, ready them, and even aid in ser­
vicing them. These tankers were to be used in fueling German 
27 
vessels on the high seas. Von Stohrer also stated that 
"the Spanish government has already shown a similar obliging-
28 
ness in supplying German U-boats." In 1940, after the fall 
of France, Spain occupied Tangier and permitted the Reich to 
26 
Hughes, 232, 
27 
Ibid,, 237. 
Ibid. 
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open a consulate which served as a key center for Nazi 
29 
espionage activities throughout all North Africa. Franco 
and his government were careful to abide, by and large, with 
the provisions of the Cultural Agreement of January 28, 
1939. Under it Spain and Nazi Germany were to have spiritual 
and cultural co-operation, and the agreement provided for 
the exchange of professors, students, books, the opening of 
schools, the arrangements of expositions, currency facilities 
in each other's country, privileged positions for the language 
of each country in the school curriculum of the other, musical 
and theatrical exchanges, motion picture co-operation, and 
all the other media by which Falangist Spain would be drawn 
nearer to the leader of the New Order—Germany. 
But the test of Spanish sincerity was yet to come. 
By the fall (October) of 1940, the Germans seemed willing 
to allow Spain to join the Axis in victory, to enter the 
war on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact alone. In the 
fall and winter of that year there were other, more impor­
tant matters to be considered than the Axis Pact and Spain's 
legal entry to it. Among these greater matters were (1) the 
defeat and occupation of the British Isles, and (2) the 
capture of the last remaining piece of continental soil 
still in British hands—Gibraltar, gateway to the 
^%ughes, 237. 
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Mediterranean. Once the Spaniards actively engaged in a 
combined assault on the "Rock," the die would be cast. 
Spain ̂ would be in the war, 
IV 
Franco had assured Hitler on June 3 that he looked 
upon the war as his own struggle, and that he rejoiced over 
30 
recent German victories. He had concluded with an apolo­
getic phrase, explaining that he could not enter the war 
because Spain suffered from a weak economic system, one that 
could not stand the strain of anything but neutrality. This 
attitude on the part of Madrid had been quickly countered by 
a communique from the German foreign office, dated June 17, 
1940. 
The attention of the Spanish government should 
be drawn to the impending collapse of France 
and its effect on German-Spanish relations. 
It is assumed that Spain has discontinued 
delivery of strategic materials to the Allies. 
Hitler was certain that Franco would, as the Fuehrer 
32 
put it, "come into the game," On July 13, he told Haider 
that Spain was to be drawn into the war and thus to serve as 
a vital part in the front the Fuehrer envisaged from the North 
30 
United States Department of State, Documents on 
German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945 (Washington D. C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1957), IX, 509, 
^^Ibid.. 605. 
32 
Haider, IV, 116. 
-19-
33 
Cape in Noi*way to Spanish Morocco, Haider learned that the 
Nazi foreign minister, von Ribhentrop, had that same day been 
ordered to go to Spain to get the foundation of the German-
Spanish undertaking well in place. 
Von Ribbentrop found conditions in the Iberian penin­
sula not what he had expected. The civil war had caused 
tremendous destruction in Spain, and World War II tended to 
hurt rather than aid her faltering economy. On May 10, he 
had curtly advised the Spanish government that her economy 
had to be built '*from within," not "from without" by means 
34 
of foreign (Allied) credits. His visit during the middle 
of July illustrated beyond all doubt the fact that he had 
been too hasty, and that Spain was truly in dire economic 
straits. This revelation of their potential ally's weak­
ness did not dampen the Germans' spirits, however. 
So confident were the leaders in Berlin that Spain 
would come "into the game" that Haider wrote on July 22 that 
an alliance between Spain and Portugal (which was rumored to 
be in the making) was agreeable to Germany—providing that 
35 
Portugal sever her ancient relationship with Great Britain. 
And so important was Gibraltar that he wrote on July 30 that 
Haider, IV, 116. 
S. Dept. of State, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy, IX, 318. 
35 
Haider, IV, 129. 
if Germany decided she could not successfully invade the 
British Isles that fall, then the attack on Gibraltar from 
the landside would be an alternative line of action, along 
36 
with possible movements into Turkey or against Suez, 
But almost as soon as General Franco learned that 
something more than cultural agreements and statements of 
"fascist unity" was expected, he began to vacillate in his 
fervor for the Axis cause. Lt. Col, Hauck reported to 
Haider on August 9 the pessimistic findings of Admiral 
Canaris, Chief of the German Abwehrt. 
Spain will not do anything against Gibraltar 
on her own accord. German intelligence reports 
to date. Drawing of Spain into (the) war will 
be difficult. Economic problems. 
But on August 23 Haider received a report from von Etzdorf, 
the military attach^ in Madrid. It was of quite a different 
hue: 
Spain is willing to enter the war on our side. 
Wants 700,000 tons of grain, in return, (Wants) 
disarmament of North Africa (Vichy-Prench), 
Post War claims: Gibraltar, Morocco, and 
Algeria as far as Oran,^® 
Haider wrote directly below this entry, "Spain wants North­
west Africa." 
Sometime in late August, 1940, the Germans began to 
gain a better appreciation of the true picture. In his 
^®Halder, IV, 140, 
^"^Ibid,. 154. 
^^Ibid,. 170. 
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somber report to Haider on August 27, Canaris pointed out 
that all was not what it seemed: 
Gibraltar; Franco's policy from the start 
was not to come in until Britain was defeated, 
for he is afraid of her might (ports, food 
situation, etc.). Now the Fuehrer is working 
on him to swing him over to our side. Suner 
is supposed to come here. Spain has very bad 
internal situation. They are short on food 
and have no coal. The generals and the clergy 
are against Franco. His only support is Suner, 
who is more pro-I^alian than pro-German 
The consequences of having this unpredictable 
nation as a partner cannot be calculated. We 
shall get an ally who will cost us dearly. 
Nowhere in Canaris' report can one find a cheerful note. 
Compare it, however, to the report Haider received from 
Bruns, another military attach^ in Madrid, on September 4, 
only ten days latere 
Franco still firmly in (the) saddle, supported 
by armed forces. General Vigon (Air minister 
and army chief-of-staff) friend of Germany. 
Internal tensions to be overcome by common 
effort at Gibraltar. (Gibraltar is conceived 
as an all-Spanish effort. a national goal, 
unitTng all political factions.> Z^talics min^ 
...Danger from Suner. Reconstruction of troop 
officers corps will take two to three years. 
Staff officers—good. Spain can furnish 350 -
400,000 men, without equipment. Has 60,000 
white soldiers and 20,000 Moors in North Africa. 
Portugal: Spain wants to prevail on Portugal 
to permit entry of Spanish troops in event of 
invasion of Portugal by foreign power (England). 
Financial^, Portugal is not tied to any foreign 
power, /italics min^. 
^^Halder, IV, 175. 
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Neither the Fuehrer nor the Wehrmacht were pleased 
with these contradictory reports from the various intelli­
gence sources in Spain. In order to settle the matter of 
Spain's role in the war. Hitler on September 14 called a 
eonference during which he impatiently reminded the military 
that a long war was undesirable for Germany, He declared 
that the war could be brought to a close most swiftly by 
an invasion of the British Isles. That being immediately 
impossible because of failure to gain control of the air 
and bad flying weather (sic), Gibraltar had to be taken, 
Haider noted, regarding the Fuehrer Conference: "Gibraltar; 
no definite orders. Merely expression of intention to 
promise Spaniards everything they want, regardless of 
42 
whether the promises can be kept. The most fantastic 
concessions were to be offered to Spain. She was to control 
West Africa as far down as twenty degrees south latitude, 
and even be granted southward expansion of the Spanish 
Cameroons (Rio Muni), 
On September 23, Hitler wrote Franco with the object 
43 
of "enlisting his participation in the attack on Gibraltar," 
and on October 7, Haider noted that the Duce was to draw 
44 
Spain into the Axis, And on October 8: "There are to be 
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45 
negotiations with Spain on a new basis." By October 15, 
Hitler was no longer vague in regard to his desire for 
Gibraltar. Haider wrote, between quotation marks, the 
46 
words of his Fuehrer: "'Gibraltar must be takenl'" On 
that same day, Hitler met and talked with Serrano Suner, the 
Spanish foreign minister, regarding German-Spanish co-opera­
tion vis-a-vis Gibraltar, but S^ner refused to commit himself 
to anything until definite colonial and economic matters 
were settled. When Hitler countered with the question of 
payment of Spain's civil war debt, Suner's answer was: "Such 
mingling of idealism with materialism is incomprehensible 
47 
for a Spaniard." Hitler is said to have felt "like a little 
Jew." Toward the end of his entries for October 15, Haider 
noted that the Fuehrer was writing a letter to Franco. The 
Spanish olaim to Oran was Just too much for Hitler to 
swallow, and "the Fuehrer is going to have a meeting with 
48 
Franco on the French-Spanish frontier." Evidently Hitler 
thought he could get further with Franco than with the 
haughty, austere Suner, 
The conference took place on October 23, 1940, in 
the little French town of Hendaye, which rests at the foot 
"^^alder, IV, 225. 
"ibid., 233. 
^'^Ibid. 
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of the Pyrenees. The meeting was secret, and accounts of it 
are sparse. The only important available source is a German 
memorandum of the conversation between the two dictators. 
After greeting his guest. Hitler told Franco that he 
was very happy to meet the Caudillo personally, especially 
since he had been with him in spirit during the civil war. 
The Fuehrer then informed the Caudillo that the war was over 
and that Britain would soon capitulate. He (Hitler) had re­
organized the Wehrmacht so that: 
Beginning in March of the following year (1941), 
the army would present itself in the following 
strength: of a total of 230 divisions, 186 were 
attack divisions. The rest consisted of defense 
and occupation troops. Of 186 attack divisions, 
20 were armored divisions equipped with German 
material, while 4 " "' ' " ' ' ' ides 
Hitler told the Caudillo that Britain now knew that the war 
was lost; in any event she would be crushed and not even her 
hope in the USSR could save her. As for the United States, 
there was no need for alarm for there would be no change in 
the status quo, at least not for a considerable time. "Until 
America's military power (will) be fully armed," said Hitler, 
/ V 50 
"at least two to four years (will) pass." But then the 
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possessed captured In 
addition to this there were 12 motorized divi­
sions. With this array strength Germany was 
grown ready for any eventuality. 
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Fuehrer informed Franco that a considerable danger for Spain 
would result should the United States entrench herself on the 
Islands lying off Africa in the Atlantic Ocean, or should 
Great Britain do the same. The danger was great because no 
one could be certain of the loyalty of the French troops 
I 
stationed in North Africa to Petain^ 
The greatest threat existing at the moment 
was that a part of the Colonial Empire would, 
with abundant material and military resources, 
desert France and go over to De Gualle, 
England, or the United States.^^ 
Hitler easily explained away the recent failure of 
the Wehrmacht to invade and occupy the British Isles. It 
had been the weather that had held up the invasion (sic). 
Since the middle of August, there had not been five fair days, 
and a major attack against the British naval forces by the 
Luftwaffe supposed favorable atmospheric conditions. Hence, 
the "cancellation" of the invasion. The Fuehrer went on to 
describe the state of affairs in which Germany found herself. 
According to Hitler, victory lay at his finger tipst 
In the meantime, England, and especially London, 
was being bombarded day and night. On London 
alone, 3,500,000 kilograms of bombs had been 
dropped. Many harbor installations, factories, 
and armament works were thus being shattered; 
England's approaches were being mined; and an 
increasing U-boat activity was contributing to 
the further isolation of the Islands. At the 
moment, the number of U-boats being finished 
every month was 10. In spring, it would rise 
to 17; in July to 25, and after that up to 34 
51 
Gantenbein, 728, 
-26-
per month*...the concentrated activity of the 
air-arm, mine-layers, destroyers, and speed 
boats would do so much damage and harm to 
England that in the end attrition would set 
in. 
The Hendaye meeting ended with what might be construed 
as the Fuehrer's final argument in his attempt to win over 
the Caudillo to the Axis war effort. While German air and 
naval forces besieged the British on the sea and over the 
Home Islands, Hitler's troops in France and the Lowlands 
would be used to crush England's last hold on the Continent-
Gibraltar. The combined German-Spanish assault would be 
crowned with victory, a victory that would be but one among 
many. Diplomatic victories had been won by Germany, and in 
his appeal the Fuehrer backed up his plan for the combined 
assault on Gibraltar by painting for Franco a striking 
picture of Axis solidarity, strength, and inevitable 
victory;. 
Naturally, Germany has an interest in ending 
the war in a short time if possible, since 
every additional month costs money and sacri­
fice. In the attempt to bring about the end 
of the war as soon as possible and to render 
the entry of the United States into the war 
more difficult, Germany has concluded the 
Tripartite Pact. This Pact is compelling 
the United States to keep its Navy in the 
Pacific Ocean and to prepare herself for a 
Japanese attack from that direction. In 
Europe as well, Germany is attempting to 
expand her base. He (Hitler) could 
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confidentially report that several other 
nations had announced their intention of 
joining the Tripartite Bact.^^ 
And Spain should now join the winning side I 
During the day-long conference the Caudillo was 
affable, dignified, and uncowed. At moments he even seemed 
detached. When he finally mounted his own railway coach to 
again cross the Bidossoa and return to Spain, he was fending 
off an insistent Fuehrer's 
"I must have your answer now," 
Answered the Caudillo; 
"I will think about it." "I will write to you.'*^'^ 
After the Hendaye conference there was correspondence 
between the two dictators and much going to and fro of minis­
ters and generals. But Franco never got around to committing 
himself one way or another. He never specifically agreed to 
join the Three Power Pact, and he never allowed Spain to 
become a declared belligerent. He simply did—nothing. 
Typical of the correspondence was an exchange in February, 
1941, Hitler addressed the usual pleas to the Caudillo 
on February 6, 1941 (after the date set for the German-
Spanish attack on Gibralter had come and passed). Franco 
left Hitler's letter unanswered until February 26, when he 
^^Gantenbein, 729. 
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replied: "Your letter of the 6 makes me wish to reply very 
promptly.. 
V 
On November 1, 1940, Haider noted in his War Journal 
that the Fuehrer was very displeased with the results of the 
Hendaye conference. He had spent an entire day with Franco 
and had received in return nothing more tangible than state­
ments about Axis "spiritual solidarity." Hitler did not enjoy 
being ignored by Franco, nor having his demands ignored. But 
Franco indisputably left Hendaye the diplomatic victor. He 
had stalled the German drive, at least for a little while, to 
push or drag—or both—Spain into the war. Haider noted be­
tween quotation marks the words of his Fuehrer regarding General 
Franco: "'Jesuit Swine'" and "'misplaced Spanish pride. 
When Hitler had recovered from his herculean effort 
at Hendaye ("I would rather have four teeth pulled than go 
57 
through it again" he told Mussolini in Florence), he 
optimistically set about organizing the means, both political 
and military, necessary for an assault on Gibraltar. After 
all, the Caudillo had not refused to co-operate, and these 
"outline plans" (as they were called) existed for every 
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contingency, although they would not be put into detailed 
preparations until the political omens were favorable. 
Hitler and his Wehrmaeht were not prone to overlook possible, 
and in this case highly probable, developments. Thus, on 
November 12, 1940, the "Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces (Wehrmaeht) issued Directive No, 18; 
Directive No. 18: Preparatory measures for the 
conduct of the war in the near future will be 
taken by the High Commands along the following 
1 ine s: 
1, Relations with France 
2. Spain and Portugal: 
Political steps have been taken to 
bring an early entry of Spain into the 
war. The object of the German inter­
vention in the Iberian Peninsula (code 
name, FELIX) will be to drive the 
British from the western Mediterranean, 
To this effect: 
a. Gibraltar must be seized and 
the Straits closed, 
b. The British must be prevented 
from establishing themselves 
on another spot in the Iberian 
Peninsula or^the Atlantic 
Islands... 
The orders for the preparation and execution of 
Operation Felix were laid down by the Fuehrer as follows: 
there were to be four phases to the action, the reconnais­
sance phase, the air attack phase, the land attack phase, 
and the occupation phase. In the first, the reconnaissance 
phase, teams of German officers dressed in civilian clothes 
were to go into Spain and arrange for the transport of troops 
and supplies through the Iberian peninsula to points of 
58 
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concentration for the attack. These "teams" were also to 
secure landing fields for the Luftwaffe's air attacks on 
the "Rock" and British ships in the harbor. 
In the air attack phase, Luftwaffe planes were to 
carry out a surprise attack from French airfields on the 
gun galleries in the "Rock" and against anti-aircraft and 
coastal batteries around Gibraltar. They were also to 
attack any shipping in the harbor. Next, of course, the 
German (and perhaps some Spanish) troops were to pour across 
the small, sandy isthmus connecting the "Rock " with the 
Spanish mainland. The troops were to capture and occupy 
Gibraltar. Additional Wehrmacht troops already in Spain 
were to be prepared to enter Portugal should the British 
attempt a landing there. These reserve troops were also to 
ucick up the attack on Gibraltar and in general to maintain 
order and to oppose an enemy landing anywhere on the Iberian 
peninsula. 
In the final phase, German forces were to aid the 
Spaniards (if necessary) in closing the Straits. Some units 
were to go to Morocco with coastal artillery, while others 
were to utilize Gibraltar. With the Luftwaffe occupying 
Spanish airfields and patroling the air over the Strait, 
with German coastal artillery on both sides of it, and with 
the German navy having mined it, the Strait of Gibraltar 
would be closed. 
-Si-
Hitler next concerned himself in Directive No. 18 
with the Atlantic Islands. But no definite plan of attack 
was laid down. The commanders-in-chief of the three 
services were simply to examine the problem of taking the 
Atlantic Islands, as well as Madeira and the Azores, and 
report to the Fuehrer with their findings. With respect 
to Italy, Hitler simply stated that no Italian participa­
tion was foreseen. 
With the passing of the autumn of 1940, Operation 
Felix became ever more complex and detailed. Haider made 
note of the fact that reconnaissance parties were being 
readied in Bordeaux. One of their duties, incidentally, 
was to ascertain the feasibility of introducing menthane 
gas into the galleries of the Gibraltar "Bock." Once 
introduced, the gas would be ignited and the galleries 
59 
and gun positions demolished. The artillery and intel­
ligence sections made their reports, stating that prepara­
tions were progressing. By November 4, 1940, Haider was 
able to identify the units scheduled to take part in the 
action: 
Against Portugal; Corps Schmidt, consisting 
of Fourth Armored Division and SS Deathhead 
Division. Over Schmidt and Kuebler (the 
commander of the SS Deathhead Division) will 
be Command Staff Reichenau. 
^^Halder, V, 1. 
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On that same day, Haider observed the readiness of the coastal 
artillery to he used in closing the Straits, as well as for 
bombarding Gibraltar: 
Artillery: captured enemy (British) guns with 
personnel batteries from 13th Draft for Spanish 
and North African (Spanish Moroccan) coast. 
Spain: get ready 15cm. and 10cm. guns; initially 
we may also lend some mobile batteries, Islands^j^ 
(will need) some captured enemy guns with crews. 
In the same entry he mentioned that he and the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army had discussed methods for crossing the 
Strait of Gibraltar to Spanish Morocco. By November 5 (seven 
days before the formal issuance of Directive No. 18) Haider 
noted that preparations were coming along so well that any 
lagging was noticeable. For example: "Readying of Armored 
units for Portugal: Sixteenth Armored Division, Sixteenth 
62 
Motorized Division not ready yet—investigate." But by 
and large deadlines were met. By November 20, the Twenty-
Second Division was fit for operations (reserve), and general 
furlough restrictions were imposed in the units earmarked for 
63 
Gibraltar, Haider recorded that Reichenau was appointed 
commander of the operation, over the protesxs of Goering who 
wanted von Richthofen (former commander of the Condor Legion) 
and the Luftwaffe to have full control. Within eight days 
(November 14) Haider wrote that the Luftwaffe had declined 
®^Halder, V, 7, 
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the envisaged mission against the Cape Verde Islands, Canary 
Islands, and the Azores. This, noted Haider, was Goering's 
doing; Hitler had turned down Goering's demand that von Richt-
hofen be given full control of the Spanish operation, and 
Goering had pouted and offered excuses for the inability of 
64 
the Luftwaffe to carry out the operation against the Islands. 
By November 11, the day before the general formal order con­
tained in Directive No. 18 was issued, Haider noted that the 
OKW had been notified that three weeks alert notice would be 
needed to make sure of the proper movement and dispersion of 
troops and materiel. Preparations, although not highly 
advanced, were at least existent. 
The success of Operation Felix depended on that 
element of synchronization that so worried Haider. There 
were numerous entries about shipping being late, or the 
airforce not knowing what to do when it had to do it, or the 
65 
lack of coastal artillery that would prevent the defense 
of the right place at the right time. Most of the entries, 
after November 12, dealt with shortages. There were not 
enough flat-bed trailers; the signal communications units 
were non-existent; coastal artillery was lacking. Perhaps 
one of the biggest concerns Haider had at that time was the 
Irun bridge. On November 25, he wrote that no decision had 
®^Halder, V, 21. 
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yet been taken by the High Command (OKH) regarding this weak 
but vital bridge. It would have to be strengthened to sus­
tain heavy military rail transport into Spain, but any work 
of that nature would have been immediately and correctly 
interpreted by British agents. It therefore had to be put 
off until the last moment before the movement of troops up 
to the Pyrenees,®^ 
The Fuehrer himself laid down some of the tactics to 
be used in the assault on Gibraltar, Every inch of the Eng­
lish territory was to be pulverized by Spanish-manned German 
guns. To accomplish this tremendous taskj great quantities 
of siege gun ammunition were needed, and there was to be 
"unlimited expenditure" of it. Twenty to thirty ammunition 
trains were to go through France, or by sea to Malaga. The 
coastal artillery, said r, had to be there in time 
to prevent the escape of unsunk British ships from the devas­
tated harbor. The attacking infantry forces were to make use 
of the heaviest tanks, each carrying 27 rounds of ammunition. 
General Haider noted the additional plan to blind the anti­
aircraft artillery and fire control centers of ihe British 
68 
by smoke bombs and heavy artillery shells. These latter 
tactics were evidently the innovations of the planning staff. 
®%alder, V, 36, 
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In regard to the Spanish and perhaps the Portugese Islands, 
since the air force had refused the task of taking them the 
navy was to investigate that phase of the operation and plan 
69 
accordingly. 
But by December, 1940, only the most foolishly opti­
mistic of the German leaders still believed that the German-
Spanish assault on Gibraltar would ever take place. Yet, in 
the "Fuehrer Conference" of December 5, Hitler made known 
that he still wanted Gibraltar. Operation Felix was to take 
place as soon as possible—for Spain would surely resolve her 
doubts and take that step which would bring her into the war. 
The latest date, said Hitler, for "F" day was to be January 
10, 1941. Hitler reminded the officers present that he 
wanted the shortest possible interval between the first air 
attack and the start of the heavy artillery bombardsient« The 
70 
decision to carry out Felix, said Hitler, was final. 
The decision to put Operation Felix into effect may 
have been final in Berlin, but in Madrid the thinking was 
quite different. The Hendaye conference had solved nothing. 
On November 25, Haider noted that the Spanish question did 
71 
not "seem to be getting anywhere.^ And indeed it was not. 
As Haider himself stated "Spain is riot going to be dragged 
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into war. They know that they would have to pay the piper 
72 
even after German victories." On November 26 he noted 
that the Hendaye-Irun bridge was under "friendly eonsidera-
73 
tion" by the Madrid foreign office, but the consideration 
was so "friendly" that absolutely nothing was ever done. 
And on December 3, two days before the Fuehrer Conference, 
Haider noted that Franco was more unpredictable than ever 
and that he had set no date for his entry into the war. 
Haider recounted the Gaudillo's own excuse: "Completion of 
74 
preparations cannot yet be predicted," 
The day before (December 2) Haider noted that Spain 
had said that two months were too short to complete prepara-
75 
tions and that Franco could accept no deadline. Six days 
later (December 8), the Caudillo told Admiral Canaris point 
blank that entry into the war by the time proposed by Hitler 
(January 10, 1941) was impossible, since no preparations had 
been made. The reasons, said Canaris, were mainly of an 
economic nature; food, fuel, etc. The Spanish transportation 
problem defied solution. Finally, the Canary's and the other 
Spanish overseas possessions would be lost, and the Portugese 
72 
Haider, V, 37. 
73 
Ibid.. 41. 
74 
Ibid., 52. 
7 
""ibid,, 49. 
-37-
Islands would be occupied by the enemy. The Islanders, said 
76 
Canaris, "would simply starve to death," 
Even Hitler was becoming convinced of Spanish hesi­
tancy, and on December 9 (a short four days after his "full-
speed-ahead" Fuehrer Conference), Hitler told Haider that 
77 
he now realized that "Spain has finally declined." On the 
12 of December, Haider made one short entry in his ffar 
78 
Journal; "Operation Felix cancelled." 
VI 
Spain's failure to live up to Axis expectations is 
now a matter of history. Franco did not "come into the 
game." The reasons are many, some of them obvious, and some 
undoubtedly hidden. The full explanation will only be known 
when ths Spanish government opens its archives. Until that 
time we can only ponder the different and varied facets of 
the Spanish paradox. 
There is, however, another question—more intriguing 
and of more Importance—that complicates the problem. When 
the Reich realized that Spain would not commit herself to war 
nor allow her territory to be crossed for a belligerent 
purpose, why did not Germany violate Spanish neutrality even 
if it meant war with Spain? 
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The advantages offered hy such a move were obvious, 
and many have already been mentioned. The capture of 
Gibraltar and Ceuta would have been, of course, the primary 
benefit, since the possession of the "two pillars of Hercules" 
would have made the western Mediterranean an Axis lake and 
given the Germans and Italians a land route and a defensible 
sea route to North Africa. An occupied Spain would have 
provided naval bases and submarine pen sites on the Bay of 
Biscay, the Atlantic, and in the Balearic Islands. Perma­
nent air bases in Spain would have placed the Luftwaffe 
within range of North Africa, the middle Atlantic, at least 
half of the Mediterranean, and almost all of southwest 
Europe. Military formations in depth would have been in a 
position to move northward against the southern flank of 
an enemy beachhead on the French or Spanish Biscay coast or 
in the south of Prance. The Canary Islands held out the 
promise of overseas naval and air bases, extending greatly 
the effective striking distance of the German navy and the 
Luftwaffe, and offering greater control of the south and 
middle Atlantic. 
Spanish population resources would have been at the 
command of the German war effort and if necessary transported 
to Germany. Spanish iron, copper, coal, and tungsten would 
also have benefited the German war effort. The gains that 
would have accrued from an Axis occupation of Spanish North 
Africa were obvious. With their western entry closed, the 
-39-
British would have had to move troops and supplies through 
a U-boat infested south Atlantic to the Suez Canal, which 
itself would have been in mortal danger as the Italians to 
the south (in Somaliland) and the west (in Libya) drove 
against a now almost isolated British outpost. "How well 
Rommel might have fared if the Straits of Gibraltar had been 
79 
closed by German siege guns and Stukas in 19411" With the 
Gibraltar entry closed, the British invasion and supply route 
would have been almost completely blocked, thereby strength­
ening that "soft under-belly" of Europe shortly to be almost 
entirely in Axis hands. The only way in which the Allies 
could have mounted an attack against any part of Mediter­
ranean Europe would have been to come through the Suez 
Canal—if it were still openl 
Finally, the capturc of Gibraltar and the occupation 
of Spain would have helped lay the foundation for the "grand 
strategy" of Goering and Raeder. The Chief of the Luftwaffe 
and the Commander of the Kriegsmarine (navy) seldom saw eye 
to eye. But at least on this one point they did agree. 
Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General 
Staff of the British Army (1939-1943), discussed the "grand 
strategy" in his work Turn of the Tide. He wrote that both 
Goering and Raeder tried to influence Hitler into joining 
Italy in an attack on Britain's weakly held bases in the 
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Mediterranean and Near East, in capturing tlie Suez Canal and 
the Persian oil fields, and, in cutting the last link of the 
Balkan states and Turkey with the West, either forcing them 
to throw in their lot with the Axis or using them as invol­
untary corridors through which to encircle the Black Sea, 
establishing air bases within striking distance of the 
Caucasion oil wells at Baku, and outflanking Russia from 
the south. Goering and Raeder suggested that one German 
army group, under von Rundstedt, advance through Spain to 
occupy Gibraltar, Algeria, and Tunisia, another under von 
Bock through Italy and Tripolitania to conquer Egypt, and a 
third under von List through Yugoslavia and Greece to the 
80 
Bosphorus and Anatolia. 
Lord Alanbrooke holds that it was precisely this 
strategy that those responsible for Britain's safety most 
feared. And, despite their inadequate armaments, the British 
had taken immense risks to prevent it. While with what might 
be called her left arm Britain guarded her home seas and 
skies, with the other she had to defend tbe Atlantic waters, 
the Strait of Gibraltar, the Egyptian desert, the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Near East. So long as she did so, 
despite their domination of Europe, Hitler and Mussolini 
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could not conquer the world. Short of defeating Britain by 
invasion or else attacking Russia, the Germans had to break 
that out-stretched arm before they could overrun Asia and 
Africa. 
Yet in the winter of 1940-41 this did not seem 
difficult. Britain's military power was dangerously weak 
and extended, and the striking power of Germany and Italy 
appeared to be almost invincibly strong. There were only 
four British battleships in the eastern Mediterranean and 
two in the western, based on Alexandria and Gibraltar, and 
some fifty-five thousand British, Indian, and Commonwealth 
81 
troops and two hundred air craft in the Nile Valley. 
This force was all that stood between the Axis and its goal, 
i.e., domination of the Mediterranean area and North Africa. 
And not only was Italy^ with her dominating strategic posi­
tion and African bastions (Italy had 415,000 troops in 
82 
Africa alone) in an ideal position to isolate and destroy 
these inadequate British forces, but the German army, which 
had overwhelmed Prance, was free to drive through Spain to 
Gibraltar, seal off the Mediterranean from the west, and 
pour into French North Africa. The question is: why did 
the Wehrmacht fail to do so? 
The Wehrmacht, in 1940-41, possessed plans that could 
have affected just such an occupation of Spain and Gibraltar, 
Q1 
Alanbrooke, 149-50. 
^^Ibid., 196. 
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In 1940 Berlin had become concerned over the possibilities 
of Allied action against Axis-held Europe via an invasion 
of Spain and/or Portugal and a subsequent drive into France. 
Blumentritt wrote; "On the Pyrenees the Spaniards presented 
no danger, but rumors were spread that the Allies might also 
83 
land on the Iberian Peninsula." On April 30, 1941, Haider 
wrote that the Fuehrer ordered an investigation and appraisal 
of British possibilities for landings in Portugal, Spain, or 
84 
Spanish Morocco. With the coming of May and the Balkan 
War, the Wehrmacht began to plan in earnest for a move into 
Spain—but only in case of a British landing. On May 2, 
Haider received a report from Heusinger in which was detailed 
military-political data of an operation against Spain and 
Portugal, and on May 3 he noted that a supply base for pos­
sible action on the Iberian peninsula was being readied at 
85 
Bordeaux. And on the next day he mentioned a directive 
from Berlin on "preparations for a military operation on the 
Iberian peninsula in the event of British moves against 
86 
Portugal, Spain, or Spanish Morocco." The code name of 
the new plan was "Isabella," It is important to note that 
Haider called it a code name for "defensive measures against 
83 
Blumentritt, 144. 
84 
Haider, VI, 91. 
®^Ibid., 93. 
^^Ibid.. 97. 
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87 
a possible Allied invasion of Spain," No German invasion 
of Spain was being planned with the sole object of occupying 
Spain, 
Throughout the rest of May, 1941, Haider made note 
of the preparations for Isabella. He wrote that the Irun 
bridge had to be restored, replacement units called up, 
88 
and the troops equipped in case of combat. Most of the 
troops in France were by then merely occupation troops, and 
did not possess the necessary equipment to wage a full scale 
campaign against British invaders. Also, the Balkan war and 
the buildup for the Eastern offensive had drained off men 
and supplies. 
The War Journal entry for May 27 holds the first clue 
as to the real significance of Operation Isabella. On that 
day Haider wrote of Spanish military ability, not as against 
the German Wehrmacht, but rather as against the British army. 
The Germans still thought of Spain as a quasi-ally, not as 
a potential enemy; 
Spain: mobilization takes 8 days. Alert period 
for march readiness 12 hours. Ammunition for 
one to three months (varying different weapons); 
tight on AA (anti-aircraft) ammunition. Fuel 
supplies for 2 months. Fighting quality of 
Spanish troops against British supposed to be 
good. /Ttalics mine/®® 
General Haider reported to the Fuehrer at the latter's head-
87 
Haider, VI, 101. 
®®Ibid., 104, 122, 125. 
89-r, -.0 = Ibid,. 135, 
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quarters on July 6, and found that Hitler envisaged an opera­
tion in Spain or Portugal against the threat of British 
landings there. Hitler maintained that at least four 
divisions—armored divisions at that—would have to go to 
France to be in readiness for the expected landings. These 
divisions would have to come from the Hussian front, but the 
Fuehrer held that at least one of them would have to go to 
France soon. This, said Hitler, would bolster German pres­
tige and show the world that Germany still had forces 
available over and above what was needed on the Russian 
90 
front. 
Thus, the German Wehrmacht switched its program from 
one of German-Spanish co-operation to one of German protec­
tion of Spain. The fact is. Hitler was willing to send 
sorely needed troops and supplies to Spain to protect her 
from the British even after Spain had reneged on her promises 
(by deed if not by word) to stand with the New Order. The 
Germans still looked upon Spain as a sister fascist state, 
as a member of the New Order. 
In 1942, the Isabella plan was dropped, or rather 
modified and renamed Ilona. In contrast to Isabella, Ilona 
provided that the ports of Bilbao and Santander were to be 
seized to forestall the British, and German troops were to 
move to the Spanish-Portugese border, but not over it as 
^^Halder, VI, 213, 
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91 
under Operation Isabella. Army Group "D" was to effect 
these operations. There was at that time (1941-42) only a 
Military Command France, since France was not an active 
theatre and troops and supplies were short. But in respect 
to possible military operations, the organization of Military 
92 
Command France was synonymous with Army Group "D". 
Operations Isabella and Ilona never went into effect. 
The fabled German plan to invade and occupy Spain, and per­
haps Portugal—the "bug-a-bear" mentioned by Alanbrooke^^—-
remained a plan, an idea, and never even drew close to 
becoming a reality. Blumentritt wrote that Isabella and 
Ilona were worked out, i.e., had a shape and an organization 
and definite, recorded goals. Both plans were based primarily 
94 
upon the defunct Operation Felix, But any plan for the 
invasxon of th© Iberian peninsula with the goal of defeating 
the Spanish and Portugese was what Blumentritt called "a 
map operation," a plotting table exercise which "never left 
95 
the cupboards of Western Command." 
It can be assumed, with comparative safety, that 
these "map operations" (like Isabella and Ilona) were based 
®%alder, VII, 321. 
93 
Alanbrooke, 195, 
^^Blumentritt, 182. 
"°Ibid., 182. 
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by and large on Operation Felix. One of them, Operation 
r! 
Kurfurst, was concerned with a frontal drive into Spain, 
much as Isabella was to bring the weight of the Wehrmacht 
straight down on newly-landed British forces. Another, 
Operation Gisela, was for the occupation of Spain after 
the defeat of the British invaders. These plans 
(Kurfurst and Gisela) were never worked out as were 
Isabella and Ilona, and as Blumentritt said, they "remained 
in the cupboard." 
Out of all this "drafting table" work and "map 
operations," one point still emerges. Adolf Hitler was 
not interested in (l) invading Spain and fighting Spaniards, 
and (2) the occupation and utilization of Spain, the greatest 
asset being Gibraltar, if it meant fighting Spaniards. In 
the spring and early summer of 1941, and in the year before 
it, the German army in the West sat dormant. Gibraltar 
hung like a ripe plum. Hitler wanted Gibraltar, but Spain 
refused to enter the war, to "come into the game." And 
once Spain had refused. Hitler concerned himself not with 
taking his plum, if necessary by force, but rather with 
protecting his vastly inferior and obviously disloyal 
quasi-ally. With all the benefits to be gained, militarily, 
economically, and politically by the possession of Gibraltar 
and the exploitation of Spain, Hitler did nothing. Why? 
CHAPTER H 
Fear of a Peninsular War 
"One sleeps where Southern vines are drest 
Above the noble slain; 
He wrapt his colors rotind his brest 
On a blood-red field of Spain." 
The Graves of a Household, 
by Felica Dorothea Hemans, 
I 
Although no historian, Adolf Hitler was a devotee 
if indeed not a student of history. He constantly found 
historical meanings in the events that took place around 
him. In Me in Kampf. he stated that "to learn history means 
to search for and to find the forces which cause those 
1 
effects which we later face as historical events." Hitler 
developed a historical basis for his "intense love of my 
2 
native Germany" and repeatedly said that during his school 
days history was his favorite subject. It was this training 
in history, under Professor Doctor Ludwig Poetsch, that made 
Hitler, by his own statement, "hate" Austria and "love" 
Germany.^ 
^Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (New York: Reynal and 
Hitchcock, 1939), p. 18, 
^Ibid.. 20. 
^Ibid., 22. 
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Although history was his favorite subject. Hitler 
was no historian, and historical accuracy was not his 
forte. His school report cards show that Poetsch gave him 
4 
only "Fair" marks in history courses. Indeed, this grade 
was the usual one received by the young student of Linz. 
Hitler's academic career was anything but brilliant, and 
he never mastered mathematics, and even received an 
5 
"Unsatisfactory" in practical geometry. But his interest 
in history was genuine, and he held the discipline in high 
esteem. Years after his study under Poetsch at the tech­
nical school in Linz, Hitler wrote that it was decisive for 
his entire future life that he had had a teacher "who was 
0 
as kind as he was firm" and who taught him "to remember 
7 
the important, to forget the unimportant," 
In his more mature days, Hitler's interest in history 
did not flag. Ernst Hanfstaenglp the companion and social 
mentor of the young politician during the late 1920's and 
early 1930's, notes in his work Hitler, The Missing Years; 
He (Hitler) was a voracious reader and 
positively stormed the historical library 
I was building up. He could not read enough 
about Frederick the Great and the French 
4 / 
August Kubizek, The Young Hitler I^ Knew (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1955), p. 51. 
^Ibid.. 49. 
®Adolf Hitler, Me in Kampf. 19. 
"^Ibid.. 18. 
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Revolution, historical parallels out of 
which he was trying to distil a policy for 
Germany's difficulties. For years the 
great Frederick was his hero and he never 
tired of quoting examples of the king's 
success in building up Prussia in the face 
of overwhelming odds. This did not seem 
to me a particularly pernicious obsession, 
as Frederick had always been a man who knew 
where to stop. 
It can be held with comparative safety that Hitler 
was conscious of the problems in, and the history surrounding, 
the Spanish Peninsular Campaign. He knew a great deal about 
Napoleon, and through his reading must have come to realize 
the obstacles that would face a modern attempt at the conquest 
of the Iberian peninsula* the first of which would most 
certainly be that of military resistance. Would the Spanish 
of 1940 fight an invader as they had in 1809, even if that 
invader were Germany, the leader of the New Order and a 
declared friend of Falangist Spain? And if they did fight, 
how effectively? General Blumentritt states that Field 
Marshal von Rundstedt "had such a high regard for the 
Spaniards that he was convinced that they would defend 
9 
themselves against any attack, Allied or German," Hitler 
himself recognized the risk: 
Occupation of Spain without the consent of 
the Spaniards is out of the question, as they 
8 
Ernst Hanfstaengl, Hitler. The Missing Years 
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1957), p. 40, 
^Blumentritt, 182, 
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are the only tough Latin people and would 
carry on guerilla war in our rear.^® 
On their own side, the Spanish were active in giving 
to the world the impression that they would resist. On 
February 12, 1942, General Franco and Dr. Salazar (the 
dictator-premier of Portugal) met in Seville. On December 
20 of the same year. General Jordana met Dr. Salazar at 
Cintra and discussed "Iberian policy," The result of these 
meetings was the declaration on February 10, 1943, of the 
alliance of Spain and Portugal in defense of the Iberian 
peninsula. On that same date Spain announced her intention 
to defend her territory against all aggressors. Germany, it 
seems, was aware of the Spanish decision to defend herself 
before the announcement by Spain. On November 11, 1942— 
before the meeting at Cintra—Germany had informed Spain 
that her neutrality would be respected. 
In so far as Spanish military ability is concerned, 
however, when one compares German estimates of Spanish 
military strength with the Wehrmaeht's in 1940-41, (see 
Chapter l) it is obvious that in terms of men and material 
the German Panzer and infantry divisions would have had 
little trouble in defeating the numerically inferior and 
less well-equipped Spaniards. Spain would probably have 
fought the Germans with the fury the French had found so 
^^Anthony Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals 
(London: Odhams Press Limited, 1948), p. 172, 
\ 
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horrible in their peninsular campaign, yet Spain's ability 
in terms of men and material was such as to make final 
victory for the Spaniards more than doubtful. If the 
Wehrmacht, then, were to come to grips with the Spanish 
armed forces, the action would most likely go well for the 
Germans. 
But the Spaniards faced the German forces with not 
only between 250,000 and 500,000 armed men, but also with 
one of the greatest natural barriers to rapid movement in 
all Europe—the Pyrenees. Spain's entire northern border 
is a mountain range of great magnitude. It extends from 
the Bay of Biscay in the west to the Gulf of Lions in the 
east, across the entire neck of the Iberian peninsula. Its 
highest peak, Pico de Aneto, rises 11,169 feet, and the rest 
of the range is rugged and interlaced with narrow and usually 
undeveloped passes, some of them leading into natural box 
canyons. The Pyrenees act as an effective barrier between 
France and Spain, and the mountains extend in some places 
over one hundred miles in depth, and thus present not only 
a barrier in height but in breadth as well. There are only 
two principal highways across the entire range, one on each 
coast line, and the passes through the interior mountains 
are rugged and high. Those at Somport, Pourtalet, and 
Puymorens are all above 5,000 feet, and that at Roncesvalles 
is 3,700 feet. The Pyrenees through history have been 
nature's gift to the Spanish in the way of ready-made forti­
fications, much as the Channel has been to England. 
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The Wehrmacht, however, was not an organization to 
be dismayed by opposing armies and their fortifications, 
man made or not. The Germans had behind them a record of 
conquest of great armies and fortifications that some had 
even termed "impregnable," The Hela Peninsula, the concrete 
and steel fortifications lacing the tortuous fjords of Norway, 
the great Belgian fortress of Eben-Emael, the Maginot Line; 
all these "unbeatable" fortifications had been all-too-speedily 
crushed by the Wehrmacht, 
There was yet another consideration that played a 
part in the thinking of the Wehrmacht and its Leader. For 
it one must turn, as indeed Hitler must have, to history. 
In April 1809 the British Army, once driven out of the Iberian 
peninsula by the French, returned and landed in Portugal. It 
was comaiandsd by Lord Henry Wellesley. In the years that 
followed that landing, to the defeat of the French forces in 
Spain in 1812-13, there raged on the Iberian peninsula one 
of the bloodiest and most barbarous wars of modern times. 
Spain witnessed two armies of two of the most modern nations 
in the world decimate each other. The Spaniard himself 
joined in, and the accounts of the suffering of the French 
at the hands of the Spanish guerrillas behind the lines 
make morbid reading. Hitler knew that Napoleon had made 
mistakes, and he firmly maintained that he was not going to 
make the same errors. Throughout his Table l^lks he again 
-53-
and again mentioned the mistakes of Napoleon and condemned 
them as stupid and fraught with danger. 
Considering the obstacles facing Hitler regarding 
an armed invasion and occupation of Spain: a small, and 
perhaps poorly armed but experienced and determined army, 
a natural belt of fortifications running across the entire 
length of the invasion route, a people historically proven 
for their natural fervor and ability in the face of an 
invader, and finally the biggest obstacle of all—the awful 
event of intervention by the British thereby opening up a 
new front in an area not fitted for tank warfare and the 
rapid transport of supplies, it is little wonder that the 
Fuehrer seriously questioned any plan for an invasion of 
Spain and turned his eyes elsewhere. The historical 
precedent—Napoleon—bore no good omen. And the British 
themselves had set out to give the Fuehrer more than 
Napoleonic history upon which to base his Judgement. 
In April, 1940, 'foe British moved into Norway, under 
what they called the "Stratforce Plan," They were promptly 
driven back out again by a superior ffehrmacht, A year later, 
in the spring of 1941, the British went to the aid of the 
embattled Greeks against the Italians. The situation became 
so bad that German troops, indeed whole armies, had to be 
sent to assist the faltering Italians and secure the tip of 
^^Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 310-11, 326, 456, 473, 
573. 
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the Balkans for the Axis (see Chapter V), But the amazing 
thing about these British interventions is that they took 
place at a time—between April, 1940 to April, 1941—when 
not only were the British Isles for most of the time to be 
threatened with invasion, but the forces that were sent to 
Greece brought about the giving up of North African territory 
just wrested from the Axis armies (see Chapter VI). The 
British thus proved that they would intervene if their 
interests were seriously affected, as in Norway and Greece, 
A German invasion of the Iberian peninsula would have 
affected British interests in a manner that would have been 
intolerable, (see Chapter l) and any threat to Gibraltar and 
the Strait would almost certainly have been met by a strong 
British counter-action, as in Norway and Greece. These 
facts must have been plain to the Fuehrer in 1940-41, 
II 
Lord Alanbrooke, writing in his work Turn of The Tide. 
stated: 
Until now (1940-41) the (Royal) Army had played 
a comparatively small part in the Government's 
calculations for winning the war. Though much 
the largest of the three services, it had counted 
for less in the struggle for survival than the 
navy and the air force. The first call on the 
nations resources and skilled manpower had been 
naval and aerial. With the gradual extension of 
the call-up the Army by now (1941) numbered two 
and a quarter million men, with nine hundred 
thousand more in the Commonwealth, Indian and 
Empire forces.,.,Yet only a small proportion of 
these were front line troops organized in mobile 
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field units. After two years of war there were 
still only half a dozen divisions in the country 
fully armed and equipped to fight the Germans 
on the Continent, 
At Dunkirk only 337,131 men had been saved, but most of 
their equipment and heavy arms had to be left behind or 
destroyed. Many of these survivors were not British, but 
French, Czech, Dutch, and Belgian. But what is of real 
importance is that despite their weakness the British had 
gone to great pains to organize, equip, and keep in permanent 
readiness two divisions prepared to occupy the Atlantic 
Islands or French North Africa in the event of an Axis move 
through Spain or against Vichy. Lord Alanbrooke stated 
that these divisions "were able to proceed overseas at 
13 
immediate notice." 
And even more important, in 1942 and 1943 the Allies 
agreed that all preparations be pressed for a cross-channel 
invasion, and studies be carried out as to when and where the 
best landing on the Continent could be effected. But at 
this same time, Churchill insisted that the possibility of 
alternative action on the Iberian peninsula be "considered 
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. 
Thus, although it can be charged that their prepara­
tions were inadequate, the British had prepared to some 
^^Alanbrooke, 26G, 
^^Ibid. 
^^Ibid., 339. 
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degree for a peninsular war. Haider himself pointed out 
again and again the not too friendly attitude of the 
15 
Portugese toward the Germans, and Blumentritt wrote; 
From time to time anxiety arose at the head­
quarters of the German Wehrmaeht that the 
Allies might land in Portugal or Spain.,,in 
the south, to invade the area of Western 
Command, 
It was upon these fears, of course, that the defensive opera­
tions of Isabella and Ilona were based, although these plans 
(see Chapter I) never reached any real measure of prepardeness 
nor operational ability. 
The Wehrmaeht's, and Hitler's, fear that the British 
might intervene in the event of a German drive into Spain 
was valid. The intervention was not only possible, but in 
light of Norway and Greece, probable. As Lord Alanbrooke 
pointed out, both the British and the Germans realized that 
to control Gibraltar was to control the western Mediterranean 
and the gate-way to that entire area. If the Germans held 
Gibraltar they would threaten Britain in a way so vital as 
to be catastrophic. These threats, multitudinous in scope, 
have been analysed in Chapter I, Churchill realized the 
situation and made his plans accordingly. From an observa­
tion of the available facts, we can surmise with relative 
safety that the Fuehrer did the same, 
1 ̂  
Haider, V, 14, 46, 4; VI, 135, 
^^Blumentritt, 182, 
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It cannot be held that the above mentioned obstacles 
to a German invasion of Spain were the main turning points 
of the Fuehrer's thinking. There were other more important 
considerations and events, but the threat of Spanish resis­
tance in a tortuous and almost impassable mountain range, 
combined with the possibility of British intervention and 
Spanish guerrilla warfare, must have presented a sobering 
picture to the Fuehrer and his Wehrmacht. On the basis of 
such fears or "obstacles"—especially when they are con­
sidered in the light of history—a plausible argument can 
be put forth that one of the many reasons Hitler did not go 
into Spain with armed force and "pick his plum" (Gibraltar) 
was the fear of a peninsular war. 
CaAPTEE III 
The Facade and the Spirit 
"Let there be no strife, I pray thee, between 
thee and me, for we are brethren," 
Genesis, xiii, 8. 
I 
Adolf Hitler felt no great attraction for the 
Spanish way of life, either its government or polities. 
Although Franco's dictatorship was ostensibly fascia and 
bore some similarities to Hitler's Germany, the Fuehrer 
found many of its aspects not to his taste. Throughout his 
Table Talks ̂ he repeatedly referred to the bad effects in 
Spain of what he termed "Church control," of a slipshod 
political unity, of an unrealistic and anarchistic economic 
policy, and he bitterly denounced the "priests and monarch­
ists who have joined together to seize power in Spain. 
His subordinates, like Goebbels, who followed the Master's 
line, spoke of Franco during 1941 and after as "weak," or 
as "a useless politician," and characterized the Spanish 
^Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 422, 
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government as "opportunistic," "disloyal," and "ungrate­
ful."^ 
But to have Hitler's liking, or respect, or comrade­
ship in the New Order was no guarantee of freedom from either 
verbal abuse or military vassalage. Even Italy's "Elder 
Statesman" of fascism and Hitler's good "friend" was not 
immune from German insults, and considering the Fuehrer's 
treatment of the Duce—giving him orders, summoning him to 
conferences on short notice, intervening in Italian military 
affairs uninvited—it is understandable why, at least once, 
the Duce lost his temper, stamped his 'foot, jutted out his 
jaw, and declared that he would endure it no longer. Ciano 
heard his master denouncing the Germans as "dirty dogs," 
complaining that they (the Germans) "take everything and 
leave us only a pile of bones," and "that this cannot go on 
3 
for long." The Duce roared that he was "sick and tired of 
4 
being rung for." Nor did it please Mussolini's ego when he 
learned that the current German joke in that year of 1940-41 
was to refer to him as the "Gauleiter of Italy." 
As strange as it may seem, Spain and its leader. 
General Franco, never had to endure the affronts suffered 
2 
Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries. edited and 
translated by Louis P. Lochner (New York: Doubleday, 1948), 
pp. 119, 124, 166. 
3 
Count Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, edited by 
Hugh Gibson (New York: Doubleday, 1946), p. 304. 
^Ibid., 360. 
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by Germany's prime ally, Italy. Until October 23, 1940, at 
Hendaye, the Fuehrer had never met his Spanish "ally," and 
the meeting was a test of whether or not Franco would become 
the "Gauleiter of Spain." Haider noted at that time (Novem­
ber 1, 1940) that Hitler heaped upon Franco's head the abuse 
5 
due such "Jesuit trickery" and "misplaced Spanish pride." 
But verbal abuse was about the extent of it. Hitler returned 
to Germany without having achieved Franco's conversion to 
his—Hitler's—plans to take Gibraltar. At Hendaye the Chief 
of the Spanish State had been friendly and even enthusiastic, 
but according to the memorandum prepared by the German govern­
ment on the meeting, no commitment was made by Franco to 
6 
Hitler. The Spaniard preferred to wait and see what the 
future would bring before he took Spain into the war. And a 
full day of the Fuehrer's pontificating could not make him 
change his mind. 
One reason why Hitler avoided military intervention 
in Spain—the desire to avoid a peninsular war—has been 
discussed. Lord Alanbrooke offers another: 
The Spanish dictator was a declared friend to 
Germany and Italy and under great obligation to 
them. Yet when that October Hitler met Franco 
at Hendaye and asked him to join the Axis, that 
shrewd despot, aware that Britain had defeated thfe 
Luftwaffe and still held the seas around Spain, 
had been curiously evasive. He had been fiill of 
assurances but had promised nothing. And though 
%alder, V, 3, 
^Gantenbein, 727-28, 
-61-
Hitler was very angry, he did not consider it 
worth while to shatter his ideological facade of 
a New Order in Europe...by forcing his way through 
the tej^ritory of a Fascist and ostensibly friendly 
state, 
To what degree the Fuehrer let the facade of the New Order 
influence his thinking is difficult to measure. But from 
his writings, words, and actions—-and from those of his 
immediate subordinates—it is possible to estimate their 
thinking and the effect on it of the fagade. 
The phrase New Order was not a glib bit of propa­
ganda emanating from Dr. Joseph Goebbels' Ministry. Rather, 
the New Order was a real and visualized system for the re­
organization of the world in general and of Europe in 
particular. John Robert Bengtson, in his work Nazi War 
Alms: The Plans for the Thousand Year Reich. states that 
the ksy to the thinking of the leaders of the German state, 
the basic consideration upon which was built the New Order, 
was the issue of race. The Nazis believed their racial 
theories, and one of the reasons they fought the war was to 
put their theories into practice. Hitler, as Germany's 
absolute ruler, istands out as the master planner of the 
New Order. Men such as Otto Strasser and Hermann Rauschning 
8 
assisted him in his evolvement of the plan. 
7 
Alanbrooke, 57, 
Q 
John Robert Bengtson, "Nazi War Aims; The Plans for 
the Thousand Year Reich" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Department of History, State University of Iowa, 1953), p. 134, 
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The Nazis considered the English, Italians, and 
surprisingly enough the Spanish, as Nordic peoples. And 
in Hitler's New Order these peoples at least were to he 
nominally independent, and were each to rule over an 
empire of their own. An Anglo-German alliance was to have 
been one of the cornerstones of Hitler's foreign policy, 
and almost to the very end of the war Hitler believed that 
he somehow could reach an understanding with the English on 
the basis of which Germany would be free to build an empire 
on the European Continent while Great Britain would rule 
9 
the seas, the home islands, and the colonies. Even when 
the end of the war was very near, in April, 1945, the Fuehrer 
rejoiced to learn of the death of President Roosevelt, for 
now, he felt, the Allies would quickly become racked by 
dissension and fall apart, and Germany would join the West, 
Great Britain and the United States, in a great counter-
offensive against Communism in the East.^^ The "miracle of 
the House of Brandenburg," however, was not to be repeated, 
and the Fuehrer soon saw his last fantastic hope dashed as 
the Wehrmacht continued to retreat on all fronts. The Anglo-
German alliance, a main building block of the New Order, 
was a wish—not a reality. 
^Bengtson, 2, 3, 40. 
^®John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemesis of Power 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1954), p. 611. 
-63-
The Italian empire in Europe under the plan for the 
New Order was to include the lands along the eastern shores 
of the Adriatic Sea, Greece, and a portion of France. The 
rest of Europe was to have been annexed to the Reich or made 
into vassel states subject to Germany's disposal. Aside 
from Italy, the only exception was the Iberian Peninsula, 
where the Spanish were to have ruled supreme I 
The available evidence would indicate that the Fuehrer 
was not a person lightly to throw aside, without the most 
serious reasons, so basic a concept of world reorganization 
as that of the New Order. This being so, it becomes a 
little more understandable why, as Lord Alanbrooke said. 
Hitler did not consider it worth his while to shatter the 
facade of the New Order by quixotic action in Spain. For an 
invasion and occupation of Spain, a proposed partner in the 
New Order, would tend to do just that. 
II 
With this unwillingness to shatter his ideological 
facade. Hitler faced the problem of the unoccupied Iberian 
Peninsula, But there were additional factors to be considered. 
Hitler was accustomed as a politician to thinking in terms 
of politics, international relations, economics, personalities, 
and prestige. These considerations were often contradictory 
^^Bengtson, 134, 
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to purely military necessities. In other words, he allowed 
political, diplomatic, economic, personal, or prestige con­
siderations to affect military decisions, often to the horror 
of the Wehrmacht. Felix Gilbert, in his work Hitler Directs 
His War, illustrates this vividly: 
What Hitler found lacking in the professionals' 
(soldiers) approach to war emerges clearly from 
the conference records. He considered three 
aspects of modern war as of decisive importance. 
One is morale....Secondly, Hitler placed great 
emphasis on making full use of modern techniques. 
...The third factor was politics. When questions 
like the retreat of the southern wing of the 
Russian front were discussed, political considera­
tions such as the repercussions on Turkey or 
Rumania weighed most heavily with him. Emphasis 
on such factors as these, or at least a different 
evaluation of their importance, formed the chief 
dividing line between Hitler and the generals, 
The catastrophe of Stalingrad serves as an example. Hitler 
attached great political significance to the capture of 
Stalingrad: 
To him it was not only a military but also a 
psychological objective, and he was convinced 
that, once this city, named after one of the 
two heroes of revolutionary Russia, had fallen 
into his hands, the political regime of the 
Soviet Union would crumble and collapse.13 
Thus, Hitler committed one and a half million men against 
Stalingrad, an objective of no great military value and 
certainly not worthy of so high an expenditure of troops. 
But the winter of 1942-43 witnessed the Wehrmacht's loss 
12 
Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1950), p. xxiil. 
^^Wheeler-Bennett, 531, 
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of 600,000 men at Stalingrad—all in an attempt to gain a 
"psychological objective," Further, as has already been 
mentioned (Chapter l). Hitler in 1941 ordered that sorely 
needed armored divisions be removed from the brittle Russian 
front and sent to France in order to "bolster German pres­
tige and show the world that Germany still has available 
14 forces over and above what is needed on the Russian Front." 
The fact that this removal of needed strength from the East 
would do more harm than good did not affect the Fuehrer. 
He was so interested in presenting a "good front," and if 
one had to send armored divisions to France in order to do 
so, then armored divisions would go to France I 
Another illustration of Hitler's preoccupation with 
political aspects as against military aspects regarding a 
given problem is to be found in the work of Karl Bart?, 
Swastika in the Air; 
In the Spring of 1942, the visual system of night-
fighting was at its peak. Kills were increasing 
and Kammhuber (Chief of the Luftwaffe night-
fighter squadrons) even hoped that they would 
rise enough to discourage the enemy. To bring 
this about he increased the strength of both the 
night-fighting squadrons and the search-light 
batteries. The successes obtained between 
Arnhem and Munster were particularly encouraging 
and it began to look as though Kammhuber might 
reach his objective (of discouraging British 
bombing raids). Morale amongst the night-
fighters was particularly high. Then came 
sudden and unexpected orders from Hitler: all 
search-light batteries...were to be transferred 
to the anti-aircraft defences for co-operation 
^%alder, VI, 213, 
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with the guns. The justification of this order 
came from a source close to Hitler: 'The night 
fighters don't shoot down much anyway, and 
Kammhuber is imposing an intolerable burden on 
industry." But the real reason was that the 
RAF had made diversionary raids on Munich and 
Vienna, and it was revealed that the air defences 
of those two big cities were anything but ade­
quate, After the raids, their Gauleiter hurried 
excitedly to Hitler complaining bitterly and 
pointing to the damaging effect upon public 
morale. The result was the order concerning 
the search-lights. Once again the reasons for 
an important order issued by Hitler had been 
political. For prestige reasons and to please 
his Gauleiter Hitler interfered with Kammhuber's 
work to defend Germany from the air and decrived 
him of one of his most important weapons. 
Is it too difficult in the light of these observa­
tions to picture the Fuehrer in 1941 pondering and asking 
himself: "If I do invade Spain, and assuming that I can 
subdue the Spanish and keep the British out, or defeat 
them if they come in, what have I won? Is Gibraltar 
worth the ill-will and suspicion of my allies? Will they 
think that if I have invaded one member of the New Order 
that I will invade others? What of the neutrals, Switzer­
land, Sweden, and Turkey, Can I invade a neutral state 
such as they and suffer no serious consequences? What of 
f 
Vichy-France? How will Petain (ruler of Vichy-France) 
react? What of French North Africa? Can I afford such 
a gamble, especially in the light of the political 
considerations?" 
Karl Bartz, Swastika in the Air (London: William 
Kimber, 1956), pp. 112-13o 
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In 1940-41, the Germans were attempting to build 
their New Order on something more than military conquest 
alone. Realpolitik, as Hitler saw it, was based on more 
than fighting. Hitler's favorite weapons, politics and 
political dealings, were in great part responsible for 
some of his notable war-time successes. Rumania was 
"peacefully occupied" on December 31, 1940, The following 
January, pressure was brought to bear upon Bulgaria, which 
became a party to the Three Power Pact on March 1 (exactly 
as Hitler had told Franco at Hendaye half-a-year before). 
Next, Yugoslavia joined the Axis camp on March 25, 1941, 
Could the Fuehrer afford to antagonize, to cause serious 
reservations, on the part of these new "allies" by an act 
of out-right agression in neutral (and yet quasi-allied) 
Spain? 
During the spring of 1941 von Ribbentrop expressed 
the widespread German conviction when he stated that "the 
X 6 
war is won," By this time the Germans had begun an 
intensive campaign to draw Vichy-France into the Axis camp, 
and after June, 1941, Goebbels mentioned that the Germans 
had managed to persuade Vichy to send battle units to the 
17 
Eastern Front to fight side-by-side with the Germans, 
Haider noted in detail the German "toe-dance" to keep the 
1 fi 
Ciano, 306, 
17 
Goebbels, 85, 
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Petain regime loyal and respectful, but at the same time 
affable. For example, he observed that in November, 1940, 
the Fuehrer had issued an order to the German military 
18 
government in France to "go slow" in Vichy. 
The behind the scenes Italian objections to a 
Vichy-German alliance were understood but met with little 
sympathy in higher German circles, Haider, for instance, 
wrote on November 18, 1940, that: 
Eventually, the conviction that Italy is an 
unreliable partner became the determining 
factor in the decision to continue in our 
original policy (under the armistice) toward 
(Vichy) France. 
Although the Italian hatred of France is outside the scope 
of this thesis, suffice it to say that the Italian aspira­
tion to humiliate a traditional enemy and acquire rich 
colonial and continental lands to add to the new "Italian 
Empire" under the New Order was in large part the motive 
for the underhanded Italian moves. 
Considering the foregoing, then, it becomes a little 
clearer that while the military sub-leaders of the German 
Reich were primarily interested in the military considera­
tions of the war, the Fuehrer, as both head of the military 
and head of the state, found it necessary to consider many 
facets of a problem, among which the military was only one. 
^^Halder, V, 29, 
^^Ibid. 
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While the Fuehrer was beyond doubt ready and willing to 
concede that invaluable military advantages were to be gained 
from a conquest of Spain and Gibraltar, he at the same time 
found this invasion and conquest a danger to, and in contra­
diction of, the entire concept of the New Order. How could 
he rightly invade and subdue a Nordic people, future leaders 
under his scheme for the future Europe? And what of the 
catastrophic effects upon the newly acquired allies, to say 
nothing of the Finns or the still relatively powerful Vichy-
France, which possessed natural and population resources as 
well as the second largest colonial empire in the world? 
What of the effect on the other neutral states? How would 
they view an invasion of a state that was strictly speaking 
exactly like them—neutral? In the spring and early summer 
of 1941 this question had real import, Gould the Reich 
afford a possible Turko-Russian "interdependence" or worse 
yet their alliance? Might Sweden assume an attitude hostile 
to the point of denying Germany needed iron ore? And what 
of the outside world? How would it look to have two Fascist 
states fighting each other, with the British there to make 
capital out of the situation? This would most definitely 
not be a "food front," 
Although these questions may seem somewhat trite at 
present, in the mind of the Fuehrer in 1941, they no doubt 
existed in some form. He made important decisions for 
political and prestige reasons of much less weight. 
Undoubtedly Hitler weighed the gains against the risks. Even 
if the military problems regarding an armed invasion of the 
Iberian peninsula could be overcome, was the venture worth 
the terrible political risk?! Was it worth the possible 
destruction of the bas ic war aim, the great and final goal^ 
Was it worth shattering the facade of the New Order?? 
Ill 
There is another aspect or ""facet" of the problem 
that, while not strictly a part of the above, is akin to 
it. Adolf Hitler was the ultimate deciding force in 
Germany, As General Jodl said, "Apart from Hitler there 
was no powerful man; there was not and could be no influen— 
20 
tial man next to him," During his interrogation. General 
Palkenhorst, the commander of the Norwegian campaign, statedi 
He (Hitler) talked to each single admiral. He 
listened to each general and had him explain 
exactly what his task was, even to the commanders 
of the boats, and discussed with them whether 
they would drop men to the left or right of a 
certain objective. He went into everything. 
It was his idea. It was his plan. It was his 
PI war 
Hitler, then, was the actual, not just the titular head of 
22 
the Wehrmacht. His decision was final. An invasion of 
20 
United States Department of State, Nuremberg 
Proceedings (Washington D. C.: Upited States Government 
Printing Office, 1947), XV, p. 43, 
21 
Bengtson, 14« 
^^Ibid.. 13, 
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the Iberian peninsula was a decision that ultimately rested 
with the Fuehrer. The history of German-Spanish relations 
had been one of co-operation. The two nations, separated 
by the French land-mass, had never fought each other in 
modern times, and certainly could not be ranked opposite 
each other as traditional enemies in those two column 
charts that diplomatic historians so enjoy drawing up. 
Thus, there existed no grounds upon which it could be 
claimed that Germany could have invaded Spain in 1940 or 
in 1941 with similar reasons or nationalistic motivations 
that she gave for her invasion of France. In other words, 
there existed no precedent for war, no galling grievance, 
no ancient hatred. 
Rather, the Nazi regime in Germany and the National­
ist regime in Spain found ground for mutual understanding 
and co-operation (except for the leading personalities 
involved). After all, they were both "fascist" and both 
members (as far as Hitler was concerned) of the New Order, 
But the important consideration is that the Fuehrer, despite 
his criticism of Spanish governmental methods, even after 
his denunciation of Spanish ways and his vitriolic condemna­
tion of "Jesuit trickery," found that he could not move 
against Spain as he was to later move against Vichy-France 
and even Italy. For the fact is that Adolf Hitler liked 
Spain, and he liked the Spaniards. 
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In the Table Talks, those private, off-the-reoord, 
informal conversation notes that Hitler planned to use as 
source material for the books he intended to write after the 
war, he again and again talked of Spain and the Spaniards. 
And while he heaped scorn on the heads of the clergy, the 
monarchists, and finally even the governmental leaders, he 
praised the Spaniards, and the virtues of the common people 
of the peninsula. Hitler touted the Spanish troops of the 
Blue Diviston fighting on the Eastern Front (see Chapter I), 
On September 5, 1942, he went on to say: 
I think one of the best things we ever did 
was to permit a Spanish Legion to fight at 
our side. On the first opportunity I shall 
decorate Munoz Grande with the Iron Cross 
with Oak Leaves and Diamonds.,.When the time 
comes for the Legion to return to Spain, we 
must re-equip them on a regal scale, give 
them a heap of booty, and a handful of 
Russian generals as trophies. 
It appears that Hitler felt that the Spanish were a 
noble people, and he held that the Spaniard and the American, 
for example, could never understand each other. "The Americans 
24 
live like sows," he said, "in a most luxurious sty." The 
Spaniard, on the other hand, was cultured and intelligent, 
25 
if not so materialistic. The Spaniard was of Gaulic and 
Arabic origin, maintained Hitler, and as such had the good 
23Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 563. 
2^Ibid., 492. 
^^Ibid., 493. 
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qualities of both. It was the Catholic Church that had 
ruined Spain, corrupted her leaders, and made her backward. 
The Fuehrer punctuated this statement with another that in 
the light of Nazi actions seems quite out of place; "In 
Madrid, the sickening odour of the heretic's pyre remained 
20 
for two centuries mingled with the air one breathed," 
As far as Hitler was concerned, it was the clergy 
and the crown that had made the Spanish people take brutal 
means to get rid of brutality. If the Spanish people were 
backward, that was the fault of their priests and their 
leaders, of that "Pontius," Franco, and the •• grave-digger 
-v* 2 7 
of modem Spain," Serrano Suner. The true Spaniard was 
a noble person, and his great hope was Fascism, Once the 
28 
Spaniard drove out the priests, he would rise. So thought 
V« A tr* II ̂  1% -V* r\ "v* 
In the spring of 1942, Hitler stated that Vichy-
France—-toward whom German policy had greatly changed by 
that time—could still "save herself"' and become a member 
of the victorious Axis if she would give up some continental 
territory and some colonial areas in North Africa. Germany 
would even compensate her with new colonies in Central Africa 
(to be taken from the British after the final victory). The 
surprising fact about this arrangement is that those North 
^®Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 235, 
^'^Ibid.. 493. 
^^Ibid.. 418. 
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African colonies were to go to Italy and to the ''ungrateful'*' 
29 
Spanish. Admost two years after Franco had refused, by 
deed if not by word, to enter the war, Hitler was still con­
cerned about the Spanish and their future empire. 
Although he was periodically the butt of the Fuehrer's 
wrath, it was not until late 1942 that Hitler began to call 
Franco "the stirrup-holder" for a future Spanish king. This 
is a baser insult than it appears, for by then the Fuehrer 
30 
hated royalty and all things connected with it. From that 
time on, the Spanish Chief of State came in for much more 
criticism. But all the while Hitler criticized the Spanish 
government and the Spanish Church, he praised the Spanish 
people. For example. Hitler mentioned that the Spanish 
workers in the Todt Organization—the German civil construc­
tion corps—were "first class." He went on to say that the 
more Germany could recruit the better, since they were very 
31 
good workers, with excellent discipline. 
Later yet. Hitler heaped more abuse on the Spanish 
leaders, and said that Franco and Simer were "stupid parsons," 
'^'seduced by royalty," and were "i^grates. At the same time, 
32 
he stated that the Spanish press was the best in Europe I 
29 
Adolf Hitler, Table Talks, 216. 
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This was because the Spanish people were so "cultured." 
Again, the Fuehrer expounded the theory that the Russian 
people, unlike the Spanish, were slaves of their priests 
or their commissars. The Spaniards, he maintained, "hate 
33 
their clergy and will soon throw their priests out." When 
that happened, Spain would enter upon a new and better day. 
These are a few examples of the "liking" the Fuehrer 
felt toward the Spanish, One would not be justified in 
holding that the main reason Hitler failed to invade Spain 
was his affability toward the Spanish, but on the other hand 
this "liking" did bear some results, or rather aided in 
bringing them about. In May, 1943, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the German navy, Admiral Raeder, recommended to the 
Fuehrer "the occupation of Spain and Gibraltar," in order 
to give the navy needed ocean frontage and submarine pen 
sites on the Atlantic and Mediterranean that were relatively 
free from enemy air attacks. Ihe Fuehrer, in answer to this 
recommendation, curtly replied: 
This was still possible in 1940, carrying 
Spain along with us, but our forces are not 
sufficient for this purpose now, and it would 
be against Spain's will. /italics mine^^! 
Also, one must not forget the statement of the Fuehrer 
contained in Chapter II: 
Occupation of Spain without the consent of the 
Spaniards is out of the question, as they are 
OQ 
Adolf Hitler, Table Talks. 493. 
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the only tough Latin people and would carry on 
guerilla war in our rear.^® /Tralics min^. 
It is difficult to find another example where the Fuehrer's 
decision to invade or not to invade a country was affected, 
especially to the high degree seen in this case, by his 
desire not to offend those who did not care to be invaded. 
There are then, two closely related lines of thought 
in the writings, words, and actions of the Fuehrer and his 
Wehrmacht, One was the desire to maintain the facade, the 
aversion to shattering the concept of the New Order. This 
thinking manifested itself in Hitler's wish to keep on the 
best relations with his new allies, Bulgaria, Rumania, 
Hungary, Finland, and Vichy-France, especially in the crucial 
year of 1941, as well as to present the best front possible 
to the neutral states and to the enemy. The other was 
Hitler's attitude toward the Spanish, his liking of the 
Spanish as a people, his respect for their courage and 
racial virtue. Hitler believed that the Spanish were a 
Nordic and a worthy people, who would after the war rule 
an empire that would be part of the New Order, that final 
and supreme end which he sincerely felt Providence had 
placed him on this earth to bring about. 
35 
Martienssen, 172. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Economy of Forces: Western Front 
"We are waiting for the long-promised invasion. 
So are the fishes." 
Winston Churchill, 
during a BBC broadcast 
to the French people, 
October 21, 1940. 
I 
During the warm summer days of 1940, after the occupa­
tion of Norway and the conquest of the Lowlands and France, 
German troops, flushed with victory, sat in cafes in Paris 
and Antwerp and Oslo gleefully singing the popular song of 
the day; Wir fahren igegen England. The confidence of both 
song writers and troops found official expression in Fuehrer 
Directive No. 16 of July 16, 194G-T-three weeks after the 
fall of France. This was Hitler's ordgr f®^ invasion 
of England, for a massive assault of the home islands in an 
effort to defeat the British armed forces and force the 
British government to bring the war to an end, 
Peter Fleming, in Operation Sea Lion, gives a detailed 
picture of the plans and preparations for the invasion and 
occupation of the British home islands during the late summer 
of 1940. General Haider, too, in his War Journal, recorded 
-78-
the involved preparations in minute detail. The history of 
those preparations and of the failure of Operation Sea Lion 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. But it is essential that 
the part played by the planned invasion of Britain in the 
sphere of German-Spanish relations—and the Wehrmacht's 
failure to invade Spain—be brought out. 
During the summer of 1940, when Germany controlled 
the shores of the Continent from the north of Norway to the 
Bay of Biscay, Hitler had other problems to consider besides 
Spain and th« British-held "Rock" at its southernmost extrem­
ity. Those other considerations were of a military nature, 
and they were of the utmost importance. For in that critical 
period—July 1940 to June 1941—the Fuehrer was faced with 
an agonizing choice. 
If he continued his westward movsment, across the 
channel and into England, and failed, he would not only lose 
prestige and the bulk of Germany's available shipping, but, 
by depriving himself of the means of making another attack, 
release the growing British army and air force for operations 
elsewhere, perhaps even on the Continent. On the other hand, 
if he Ignored the Islanders and attempted to move through 
Spain, capture Gibraltar, and invade North Africa, he would 
face them on a wider front with thinner defenses. He could 
not afford to leave the British alone after their refusal of 
a peace, for with the support of their backers in the United 
States they would grow steadily stronger, particularly in the 
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air, and ultimately confront him with that major war on two 
fronts, which it had been his object to avoid. 
And there was still another factor of the problem 
to be considered, a factor of the greatest magnitude. Lord 
Alanbrooke puts it thus: 
To the east of the Reich, incorporating the 
plains of eastern Poland and the Ukraine and 
the Caucasian oil fields he had resolved to 
conquer, lay the Communist empire of Russia, 
with its vast resources and population and 
its Ten-Year Plan of industrialization, 
threatening Hitler with a mechanized military 
power that would presently surpass his own. 
Sooner or later, if he delayed his eastward 
march, he knew that he would have to face a 
Russian attack—a possibility of which he had 
been unpleasantly reminded during his summer 
campaign in the West when the USSR had annexed 
the Baltic states and Rumanian Bessarabia. 
Hitler was convinced that in spite of all their admiration 
and fear of the mighty Wehrmacht, and all their professions 
of friendship, the Soviet leaders were only playing for time. 
It seemed essential, therefore, that if he could not induce 
Britain to make peace, he must either rid himself of her by 
sudden invasion and occupation, or keep her growing air and 
land forces tied down by the threat of invasion until the 
Soviet danger at the "backdoor" of the Reich could be dealt 
with. 
Hitler himself best described his dilemma. As he 
put it, he was "in the position of a man with only one round 
^Alanbrooke, 195, 
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left in his rifle; if he missed, the situation would be worse 
2 
than before." He could not afford to leave the British 
alone, and he could not ignore the growing threat to the 
Reich in the East, He had one round left in his rifle. 
Which way should he shoot? East? Or West? 
In the face of this problem the importance of the 
British outpost of Gibraltar appreciably lessened. The 
Fuehrer, especially in 1940, had a military machine he felt 
was capable of crushing any enemy including England or Russia, 
but only one at a time. From the events of that summer, from 
the actions of the Fuehrer and even more of his Wehrmacht, it 
becomes apparent that in the summer of 1940 Hitler chose to 
move first against England. He reasoned that the threat of 
invasion would force the English to retain most of their 
forces in the home islands, thereby freeing Africa, the 
Balkans, and the Iberian Peninsula from the danger of large 
concentrations of British forces and would keep Russia to the 
East primfirily dependent upon her own resources for invasion 
or defense. 
On July 30, 1940, General Haider made an entry in 
his War Journal that summed up the main points of the German 
strategy. That strategy (the invasion of England) was to 
be drastically changed in a short time, but was at that 
2 
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time a real and deadly serious plan of action. General 
Haider wrote: 
The question whether, if a decision cannot 
be forced against Britain (surrender), we 
should in the face of a threatening British-
Russian alliance and the resulting two front 
war turn first against Russia, must be 
answered to the effect that we should keep 
on friendly terms with Russia. A visit to 
Stalin would be desirable, Russia's aspira­
tions to the Straits and in the direction 
of the Persian Gulf need not bother us. On 
the Balkans, which falls within our sphere 
of interest, we could keep out of each other's 
way. Italy and Russia will not hurt each 
other in the Mediterranean. This being so, 
we could deliver the British a decisive blow 
in the Mediterranean,.and with the aid of 
Russia consolidate the Reich we have created 
in Western and Northern Europe. That much 
being accomplished, we could confidently 
face war with Britain for years.^ 
The invasion of England was a project that had been 
4 
worked on by the German navy since 1939. Admiral Raeder, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the German navy, pushed the project 
himself, and finally won the Fuehrer's assent to it in June, 
1940.^ On July 2, Keitel, Chief of the OKW, issued instruc­
tions to the three services to prepare invasion plans, but 
it was not until July 16 that Hitler signed a directive 
fixing the middle of August as the time by which preparations 
6 
were to be completed. On July 21, Hitler made his famous 
IT" 
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Reichstag speech, which was a warning to the British that he 
was coming and that their only hope was to capitulate. 
II 
In Operation Sea Lion Peter Fleming pointed out that 
in Germany after the war it became the custom to speak of the 
proposed invasion of England as an almost "whimsical project 
7 
which nobody took seriously at the time." He quoted German 
wartime personalities who stated that the preparations went 
forward in the relaxed and academic atmosphere of a "Krieg-
spiel," a training maneuver. Other writers have advanced 
variations of the theme that the invasion was only a kind of 
strategic doodling. The facts do not support them. 
The most important of these facts is that the Fuehrer 
ordered that the invasion be carried out. His order may have 
lacked the crispness, the detail that other orders of this 
type contained, but it did not lack the compulsion. Hitler 
issued Directive No, 16 before he realized the difficulties 
that the invasion would bring. But even after those diffi­
culties had been made plain to him he in no way changed the 
order, nor did he, even provisionally, commit the great 
military machine which he had driven headlong to the Channel 
8 
coast to any alternative strategyo On July 21, five days 
7 
Fleming, 238, 
®Ibid., 328. 
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after he had issued his order, Hitler told those present at 
a conference on naval affairs: 
The invasion of England is an exceptionally 
daring undertaking, because even if the way 
is short this is not just a river crossing, 
but the crossing of a sea which is dominated 
by the enemy. This is not the case of a 
single-crossing operation as in Norway; 
operational surprise cannot be expected; a 
defensively prepared and utterly determined 
enemy faces and dominates the sea we must 
use. For the army forty divisions will be 
required.. 
Here, in the middle of July, the Fuehrer illustrated beyond 
all doubt the fact that he fully understood the gigantic 
problems the proposed invasion presented. 
Further, had there existed a plan for the systematic 
reduction of England by the bombers of the Luftwaffe, it 
might be possible to maintain that the three Air Fleets which 
were set in a great half-circle facing the southern and 
eastern shores of the Island played all the while an ulterior 
role. One might hold that instead of being assigned only 
the duty of paving the way for Operation Sea Lion, that 
those forces were the real instrument of Hitler's design. 
But no such ulterior plan existed. The air offensive 
against London and other British cities was not planned as 
an insurance against the invasion having proven impossible. 
In point of fact, the air offensive was not planned at all. 
Directive No, 16 stated: "In this operation elements of the 
^Bullock, 545, 
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10 
air force will do the work of the artillery..." And this 
is just what the bombers of the Luftwaffe were doing when 
Operation Sea Lion was cancelled. The only reason the 
bombers still flew over London after the cancellation (as 
Fleming points out) was that they had been given nothing 
else to doi 
Fuehrer Directive No. 17, of August 1, 1940j called 
for an intensification of air and sea warfare against England 
but did not lay down a long-range bombing policy such as was 
devised by the Allies in 1943 and 1944. It was an order for 
more destruction by the "artillery," nothing more. It was in 
no sense an alternative strategy. 
Hitler, in the summer of 1940, stood firm in his 
decision to conquer first the West and then the East. On 
November 23, 1940, he harangued his Goaimaaders-in-chief and 
stated that a move against the East could only be commenced 
when the West was secure. 
Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of England, was not 
a "Kriegspiel." It was, during the summer and fall of 1940, 
a real and serious project. And after all, the problem of 
Gibraltar would have been quickly solved by an invasion and 
occupation of Britain and the subsequent capitulation of the 
British government. It was not until October, 1940, that 
10 
Fleming, 239, 
^^Ibid, 
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Hitler began to think seriously about a combined German-
Spanish assault on Gibraltar, and then only through the 
12 
urging of Goering and Raeder. By that time Operation Sea 
Lion was for all intents and purposes postponed. And the so 
called "postponement" was its death. 
The foregoing has been a brief explanation of Opera­
tion Sea Lion. This proposed invasion of England never took 
place, but it did play a role in the German decision not to 
invade Spain and Gibraltar, even after it was "postponed." 
And it is because of this role that it must be considered 
here. Between the fall of France in June of 1940 and the 
"postponement" of Operation Sea Lion in October of 1940 was 
a period of five crucial months. Those five months comprise 
the first period to be considered below. The even more 
critical months—those eight from October, 1940, to June, 
1941—leading up to the invasion of the USSR, form the 
second period to be investigated^ 
III 
It is an axiom of military science that you can do 
only so much with so many troops, that you can count on 
gaining only so many goals with the power you possess. The 
proper distribution and utilization of this power is known as 
economy of forces. From June until October, 1940, the German 
12 
Alanbrooke, 196, 
Wehrmacht was preparing for the invasion of England, Operation 
Sea Lion. It was engaged in no land combat, was fighting no 
continental enemy. All of the West was conquered and under 
control. Disregarding for the moment the reasons offered 
in the foregoing chapters for Hitler's failure to invade Spain 
and Gibraltar, and assuming, for the sake of investigation, 
that he could have ordered simultaneous operations against 
Great Britain and the Iberian Peninsula, why did Hitler 
refrain from an attack upon the Iberian Peninsula during 
those first five months, between June and October, 1940? 
The German military position in the West for that 
year has already been discussed in Chapter I, but a short 
recapitulation reveals that in the^ West the Germans were 
maintaining 165 divisions, with an airforce that could put 
into the air 57 bomber and dive-bomber groups and 41 fighter 
13 
groups. The German navy possessed ports all the way from 
N o rway to Bordeaux, and the U-boats were fighting hard to 
interdict English sea traffic and whittle down the British 
fleet to a point that the German high-seas fleet could offer 
14 
reasonable opposition with some chance of success. On 
July 31, 1940, Haider noted that the Wehrmacht could control 
the West with perhaps only 60 divisions (7 in Norway, 50 in 
France, and 3 in Belgium and Holland) thereby freeing about 
^%alder, IV, 82-3. 
^"^J. F. C. Fuller, The Second World War, 1939-1945 
(New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), p. 85. 
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120 divisions of the 180 divisions in the West and the Zone 
15 
of the Interior for movement elsewhere. The destination 
of those mobile forces is the most interesting part of the 
entry, especially when one considers it in light of the date 
the entry was made. But that destination—the eastern 
frontier—will be considered in a later chapter. The impor­
tance of the entry here is that General Haider wrote of the 
strength of the Wehrmacht, a strength sufficient to allow the 
withdrawal of 120 divisions from the West. And one must add 
to this that 40 more divisions were to land in England, and 
were to be "highly mechanized and numerically superior to 
16 
the opposing armies." General Haider presented a picture 
of imposing strength in the German armed forces. 
But the picture was a false one, Haider's day-to-day 
entries in his War Journal during this period give the real 
picture of the German military situation as of the summer and 
fall of 1940, Speaking in terms of divisions, the German 
army appeared strong. But when one considers the woes and 
worries Haider entered in his Journal for this five month 
period, the true aspects of the military situation become 
apparent, and the German Wehrmacht's strength as of 1940 is 
seen in a different light, 
1 K 
Haider, IV, 145, 
^^Fleming, 41, 
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On July 22 Haider wrote: "Britain's position is hope­
less. The war is won by us. A reversal in the prospects of 
17 
success is impossible." This was an inspring statement of 
faith, but not a statement of fact, for this entry was out­
numbered a thousand times over by other entries that, for 
example, bemoaned the fact that the tire situation was "bad," 
18 
the fuel situation "very bad." The troops, even in those 
comparatively happy days were short in number and whole 
divisions were needed in newly-conquered Norway and in the 
new allies of Rumania and Bulgaria, as well as for duty all 
19 
over the West. Some troops in the West were without 
motor-transport, and had to make do with horse-drawn trains. 
Eventually, whole divisions in France were without trucks 
or light lorries, but dependent upon horses. 
So bad was the transport situation, so short was 
the Wehrmacht of trucks, tires, and fuel, that Haider on 
July 26 was trying to figure out some way to get between 
4,200 and 7,000 horses ashore with the first and second 
waves of Operation Sea Lion. His solution was that the 
Wehrmacht had to find some way "to decrease the number of 
horses" needed so desperately for transport by the proposed 
invasion forces,^® 
^"^Halder, IV, 126. 
1 Q 
Ibid., V, 51. 
^®Ibid., 44. 
20 
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Further entries of this type are numerous. In the 
fall of 1940, Haider wrote that the activation of General 
Headquarters troops for France would have to be curtailed, 
since the activation of a new SS division completely 
21 
deprived the Wehrmacht in the West of new trucks. In 
October, he made a long and detailed entry bewailing the 
fact that the delivery of spare parts was almost non-exis­
tent, that there were no maintenance non-commissioned 
officers, no technicians, that they had received no tire 
replacements at all, and that the troops, inadequate in 
number, were burdened with construction work and had to 
22 
live in lean-tos and tents. 
If the Wehrmacht could count divisions in three 
digits, it may be asked, why was there a lack of troops? 
For an insight into this problem one can turn to an entry 
made by Haider in November, 1940, It reads; 
The 250,000 men (about 15 divisions) with 
two months training set out in the General 
Army Office estimate actually do not exist... 
Military Districts have not called up enough 
recruits 
He went on to note that the next recruit class would not 
finish its primary training until March, 1941, almost half-
a-year in the future, 
^^Halder, V, 23, 
22 
Ibid>. 21. 
^'^Ibid.. 20. 
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In still further entries, one finds Haider trying to 
figure out how to supply divisions with sorely-needed trans­
port. He finally proposed the cutting down on ammunition 
trucks and the handing over of these vehicles to the divi-
24 
sions. That meant, of course, that in time of emergency 
or even in the invasion of England the ammunition supply 
would either be reduced or the transport of so vital a 
commodity thrown back on more primitive means, namely, mules 
and pack troops. 
Again, all through the entries for this period Haider 
25 
complained of a lack of field artillery. There was not 
26 
sufficient anti-aircraft artillery. The army suffered 
27 
from a deficiency of reconnaissance planes. Officer 
personnel were short and the Wehrmacht had trouble finding 
28 
troops, and the Engineering units needed new officers, and 
the anti-aircraft units as well were short of command per-
29 
sonnel. 
The Navy, filled with confidence, announced that it 
had lost only one-third of its entire U-boat strength (28 out 
^Salder, V, 20. 
Ibid.. 8, 9, 33, 48, 49. 
^^Ibid., IV, 180. 
27 
Ibid. 
^^Ibid.. 182. 
^®IMd. 
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of 76), and that if it were able to increase its active 
strength to 120 U-boats by the Spring of 1941, it might then 
30 
be able to starve Britain into surrender. Haider noted on 
September 6 that 45,000 more railroad men were needed to run 
31 
the railways of the West during the invasion of England, 
There was also a shortage of fodder for the horses depended 
upon for transportation, as well as a lack of stables, veteri-
32 
nary officers, and troops trained in horse care. 
These are but a sampling of the entries made by Haider 
during the first five month period under investigation. In 
the face of such facts, any evaluation of the German practice 
of the economy of forces would depend upon the goals the 
Germans hoped to achieve with those forces. In other words, 
assuming for the moment that the Fuehrer might have wanted 
to invade the Iberian Peninsula in the summer and autumn of 
1940, the period during which Operation Sea Lion was in 
preparation, could he or his Wehrmacht reasonably assume 
that a simultaneous operation against Spain, Portugal, and 
Gibraltar was feasible from the point of view of the economy 
of forces? Could Operation Sea Lion succeed while troops 
supplies, transport, fuel, and munitions were being diverted 
to an action in or against Spain and Portugal. 
^®Halder, IV, 184. 
^^Ibid,. 186, 
^^Ibid.. 230. 
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It is doubtful that these considerations would have 
been answered in the affirmative. The disparity between the 
ability and the goal loomed too great to be ignored. But it 
is even more doubtful that the Fuehrer was forced to weigh 
Britain against Spain and Gibraltar in terms of the economy 
of forces. As has been pointed out, in 1940 Hitler was in 
control of Western Europe. In that summer the Germans felt 
that Spain was as good as "in the game" anyway. And with 
the surrender of the British government, Gibraltar would be 
an automatic prize of war. 
For the period from June to October, 1940, the five 
months between the fall of France and the postponement of 
Operation Sea Lion, the invasion and occupation of Spain and 
Gibraltar was not only improbable from the viewpoint of the 
eeonoray of forces, but also because there appeared to be no 
need for any such action, Spain could be "counted on," and 
Gibraltar would fall like a ripe plum when the trunk of the 
tree, the Home Islands, was given a good hard knock, 
IV 
On October 12, 1940, General Haider wrote in his 
Journa1: "OKW has decided to call off 'Seeloewe' (Sea Lion)."^^ 
It was not until January of the next year that the "post­
ponement" was made into a "change of tactics," but for all 
Q O 
Haider, IV, 229. 
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intents and purposes Sea Lion was dead as of the middle of 
October, 1940. In his entry for October 15, Haider summar­
ized the logic of the Fuehrer, the reasons Hitler gave his 
officers for the cancellation of the invasion of Britain. 
Fuehrer on military situation. War is won, 
rest is mere question of time. Aim is to 
terminate war at earliest date. Review of 
preparations against British last summer. 
It was a mistake. Excessive crowding of 
invasion fleet (brought losses due to 
British air activity). The decisive factor 
was poor weather: Only five consecutive 
days of clear skies were needed, but they 
did not come. 
The Fuehrer's statement may have sounded plausible 
to some of the officers, but once again the picture is not 
that presented in the official Fuehrer Conference report. 
One of the main reasons the invasion never took place was 
that the invasion was not a glorified river-crossing, a 
35 
fact the Fuehrer well knew. The 40 divisions that were 
to have gone to England in glory in mid-August had by mid-
September been cut down to 13. The reason was simply that 
the German navy did not have the wherewithall to transport 
3 6 
40 divisions to the shores of the Island. Only with the 
greatest difficulty could it secure sufficient sea transport 
to ferry and land 13 divisions. 
Haider, IV, 232. 
^^Fleming, 47. 
^^Bengston, 96. 
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But by the beginning of September, ships and barges 
started to move to their embarkation points, and operational 
orders for the invasion were issued on September 3, It was 
all in vain. The Luftwaffe had failed to achieve air 
superiority and to crush the British will and ability to put 
up overwhelming resistance. The final order for the invasion 
could not be given. On September 14, Hitler decided to post­
pone the operation. But the preparations for invasion went 
on up to October 26, the day Haider noted its official post­
ponement. The following January Mussolini told Ciano that 
in a conference with the Fuehrer he had found: 
A very anti-Russian Hitler, loyal to us (Italy), 
and not too definite on what he intends to do in 
the future against Great Britain. In any case it 
is no longer a question of landing in Great 
Britain,^' 
One can imagine that had Hitler pursued the invasion of 
England with his characteristic vigor he might have ordered 
his soldiers, if need be, to cross the Channel in rowboats, 
horses and all. But he did not, for his eyes had turned 
elsewhere, toward Russia, 
But what of the second period, the eight months from 
October, 1940, to June 22, 1941, the date Hitler threw every­
thing available into the assault on the Russian colossus? 
What was the German military position during those trying 
days, the same period during which Hitler and Franco met at 
Ciano, 338. 
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Hendaye, during which Operation Felix was hatched and buried, 
and during which Franco—much to the anger of the Fuehrer-
refused to come "into the game?" 
It was in this period that Hitler ordered the advance 
of the Wehrmacht into rebellious Yugoslavia, into Crete, 
Greece, and the vastness of North Africa. These movements 
will be considered in detail below, but suffice to say here 
that they put a great strain on the Wehrmacht, and spread it 
thinner than ever. In the West, from October, 1940, until 
Jane 1941, the Wehrmacht could still count divisions in three 
digits. But it had been w'eakened by the abortive invasion 
preparations against Britain, and the constant drain it had 
suffered in troops and materiel to the Balkans and North 
Africa. 
The Luftwaffe had by this time engaged the EAF in 
the Battle of Britain, and on September 26 Haider had written 
that the British were winning: 
They (the British) still have 300 fighters 
available, including 200 older types, which, 
however, are more than a match for our 
bombers. We have suffered considerable 
losses in long-range fighters, 25-30%, with 
losses in our bombers going up to 300.^8 
This entry was made before the real power of the RAF had been 
felt by the Luftwaffe. In 1941, Haider's figures would seem 
infinitesimal. By October, the RAF had destroyed 1,733 German 
^®Halder, IV, 209 
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39 
aircraft. The best the Luftwaffe could ever do was to 
achieve a ratio of 5-7, and that was on their brightest day 
when they lost 378 aircraft and the RAF 277. This "good" 
day occurred on September 6, 1940, twenty days before 
40 
Haider's prophetic entry. 
By the end of 1940, and even more so in the Spring 
of 1941, the Gej'man losses grew. By the beginning of 1941, 
the mighty German Luftwaffe could mount in the air only 
41 
some 300 serviceable fighters. Over their eight month 
period, the Luftwaffe had lost more than half of its total 
42 
first line strength. And with its remaining aircraft and 
pilots, the Luftwaffe during this second period had to support 
German moves all the way from Crete to the Sahara to the North 
Sea. 
During this eight month period, 1940-1941, British 
air and naval potential and real strength were growing, and 
the Wehrmacht found itself hard pressed on land and on sea. 
As Spain had become the "bleeding ulcer" of Napoleon, so 
North Africa had become a drain on the Wehrmacht, and the 
soldiers of the Afrika Korps were fighting for their lives 
39 
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by the end of the year. The German navy, never really strong, 
had by June of 1941 lost much of its high-seas strength, 
including the powerful Bismarck. The submarine war did not 
progress as Doenitz had expected and as Haider had recorded 
back in 1940. England was not being starved out, and the 
U-boat arm had not risen to 120 first class vessels. 
It was also during this period, even as he was con­
sidering the German-Spanish alliance and the capture of the 
outpost of Gibraltar, that Hitler turned his eyes to the East. 
As Lord Alanbrooke has said, Hitler had to break the "ring" 
around hitn. The Fuehrer had to either crush England, secure 
Africa, or conquer Russia. 
It can be held, then, that another reason the German 
Wehrmacht failed to invade and occupy the Iberian Peninsula 
was that from the early summer of 1940 until the fall of that 
year it was engaged in planning Operation Sea Lion, a project 
Field Marshal von Brauchitsch described as: 
A frontal attack against a defence line, on 
too narrow a front, with no good prospects 
of surprise, and with insufficient forces 
reinforced only in driblets. 
From the autumn of 1940 until the early summer of 1941, the 
German military machine suffered from a lack of available 
forces, induced in part by the abortive invasion preparations, 
43 
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as well as the advance into the Balkans and the campaign in 
North Africa. It was too thinly spread, and did not care to 
engage itself in yet another campaign which held out the 
prospect of a long and costly war on an inhospitable terrain 
against a probably strong army of foreigners to its front 
and fanatic guerrillas in its rear. And even more, the 
invasion of Spain and Portugal, and the assault on Gibraltar, 
would take needed troops from the Balkans, North Africa, and 
the gradual buildup so painstakingly being scraped together 
for the Eastern offensive. 
In terms of the economy of forces, especially in the 
West, the invasion of Spain and Portugal (even if it had ever 
been seriously considered in this period) would have been 
beyond all doubt turned down as impossible. Spain was con­
sidered to be something between an ally and a friendly 
neutral, and Gibraltar, when weighed against Britain and 
then Russia, was a secondary objective, an outpost. 
CHAPTER V 
Economy of Forces: Eastern Front 
"In Russia, Germany has started a hemorrhage 
that will have incalculable consequences." 
Count Galeazzo Ciano, 
July 18, 1941. 
I 
During the first week of October, 1940, the German 
ambassador to Rome, Clrich von Hassell, wrote in his diary. 
As the scheduled defeat of England did not 
materialize this fall, Hitler and Mussolini 
are like two tigers in a cage who hurl them­
selves against the bars. For the time being 
they express themselves in words rather than 
in deeds; fixst the one and then the other 
makes new war plans.^ 
Hitler realized at the time that there were any number of 
military moves he could make. But he also realized that 
no matter what course was adopted, it had to bring the war 
to an end. The Fuehrer had tried diplomatic negotiations 
with the English during the summer and had found the Islanders 
unwilling to capitulate. Diplomacy having failed, military 
methods were used, and the invasion of the British Isles ivas 
prepared. But in order to be successful, Operation Sea Lion 
had to be executed with both dash and considerable military 
^von Hassell Diaries, 152. 
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strength. Hitler had found that he did not possess the 
necessary armed might to invade and occupy Britain. Rather, 
by the beginning of 1941 the British stood as the main enemy, 
whose strength grew greater every day. 
After the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion in 
October, 1940, the Fuehrer took under consideration a 
number of different military projects, including the pro­
posed attack on the British base at Gibraltar, an attack on 
2 
Turkey, and the invasion of the USSR, Ciano wrote the next 
spring (l94l) that Hitler had no precise plan of action, that 
Russia, Turkey, and Spain (Gibraltar) were in his (Hitler's) 
opinion only places to disperse forces, and that one could 
not find the decisive engagement, the sought after "Battle 
3 
of Decision," in those outlands. Ciano recorded the words 
of his master, the Duce, regarding the Axis problem of where 
to go and what to do; "They (the Germans) are now sick of 
victories. They now want the victory—a victory which will 
bring peace. 
But the war the Fuehrer was prosecuting against the 
British was not bringing peace. Hitler found that rather 
than having manoeuvered the British into a "Battle of Deci­
sion," he had manoeuvered himself into a dilemma. The 
British refused to negotiate with him, the British Isles 
^Haider, V, 24, 35. 
^Ciano, 361. 
^Ibid. 
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could not be invaded by his Wehrmacht for lack of military 
strength, and the Royal Navy and the RAF were now too strong 
to be defeated by inferior German naval and air forces. 
Hitler possessed no means by which to beat down the enemy, 
let alone invade and crush him. 
But, as has already been pointed out, Hitler could 
not afford to ignore the British, for their strength was 
growing, especially through the aid of their American 
supporters. If he left the British alone, they would grow 
steadily stronger and ultimately confront him with equal 
5 
or possibly superior forces, especially in the air. Thus, 
some other means had to be found, some other method to 
defeat Britain, 
War, someone has said, is four-fifths geography. 
Hitler appreciated (as his subsequent actions proved) the 
geographic problem facing him in 1940, The Reich was almost 
encircled. Britain bounded it on the west with air and 
naval might, and on the south with yet more naval and air 
power, and in both directions with a growing and determined 
army. Hitler recognized that in order to dominate Europe 
he had to break out of Europe, especially if he were ever 
going to defeat Britain. The very daring of Britain's 
offensives in the air over Germany, in Africa, and in the 
Near East caused him to think her stronger than she was, 
5 
Alanbrooke, 195. 
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6 
and led him to praise the British and their "toughness." 
These British offensives, either political as in the Near 
East or military as in Africa, caused Hitler (among other 
factors) to refrain from attacking Turkey in 1940 and so 
securing the oil of the Near East, and a dominating position 
7 
on Russia's southern flank. 
The British held at least a thinly garrisoned line 
from Iraq to the Shetland Islands and with their air and 
naval power extended it to India and the Arctic Ocean. 
Faced as he was by this geographic encirclement, the Fuehrer 
decided to move in the only direction left open to him. On 
June 22, 1941, the impatient German dictator launched his 
armies in a frontal assault on the USSR. Barred by the 
tenuous ring of British power from breaking out of Europe, 
he struck eastwards into the boundless plains of Russia. 
On July 18, less than a month after the start of the cam­
paign, Ciano wrote in his diary; "In Russia, Germany has 
started a hemorrhage that will have incalculable consequences. 
II 
The Fuehrer had his reasons for the attack on the 
USSR. He was not by any means ignoring the dilemma presented 
Pk 
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him Ijy the British, and he was solving, or so he thought, 
the problem of the Soviet threat to his "backdoor," the 
danger of a Russian invasion of the Reich. This threat was 
real, maintained Hitler. The Russian movements in Rumanian 
Bessarabia and in eastern Poland were all part of a build­
up for the attack on Germany, As far back as the fall of 
1940, the Wehrmacht had been ordered to protect the eastern 
border, and by December Haider noted that he was engaged in 
map operations dealing with the "line Minsk-Kiev" of the 
9 
"Eastern offensive." Throughout his entries for the late 
winter and spring of 1940-1941, Haider made note of Russian 
military strength, transport facilities, and political situ­
ations, among other things.^® By March, the notes were of 
such length and detail that one can see that the campaign 
was being planned with great eare. During the preceeding 
December, the Fuehrer had ordered the training of military 
interpreters—in the Russian language. This order, dated 
December 10, came only a little over a month after the 
cancellation of Operation Sea Lion,^^ 
The motives for the Invasion were ccmplex; yet they 
fitted into a pattern of logic which Hitler held and defended. 
According to Haider, Hitler called the invasion an "inducement" 
^Haider, V, 49. 
^^Ibid.. 74, 78, 85, 87, et al. VI, 1, 3, 4, 5, et al. 
^^Ibid.. V, 63. 
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12 
that would bring England to the point of surrender. Just 
before the invasion, Hitler wrote to Mussolini that "the war 
13 
against Russia is aimed at England." 
On Sunday, March 30j 1941, the Fuehrer called a 
general meeting of his military chiefs. The topic of con­
versation was the planned invasion of the USSR, and the 
Fuehrer began by stating that the British had made a terrible 
mistake in not taking advantage of the German peace offers 
of the previous summer. But since they had not, and since 
the invasion of Britain or the defeat of their navy and air 
force was not possible at that time. Hitler declared that the 
Soviet Union was to be invaded and quickly occupied. Britain, 
said Hitler, based her entire hope for victory on two factors; 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The British assumed 
that the former would supply Britain and also enter the war 
against Germany in the not too-distant future, and that the 
latter would soon declare war on Germany and present Hitler 
with a second front. Recent Anglo-Russian negotiations and 
Russian military movements in the east, held the Fuehrerj 
supported beyond doubt his contention that the Soviet Union 
14 
was preparing for an attack on the Reich, It was therefore 
^^Halder, V, 54. 
13 
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necessary. Hitler told Goering, to "anticipate a quick and 
15 
sudden stab in the back from the Soviets." 
This being the situation. Hitler stated that the best 
move would be to ignore the United States for the time being 
and to invade and quickly crush the Soviet Union. He held 
that the United States would not be able to reach her maxi­
mum war production for at least four full years and even 
then would face a shipping problem. Also, there was strong 
agitation in the U. S, against entering another European 
war. As for the Soviet Union, the Fuehrer simply stated; 
Only the final and drastic solution of all 
land problems will enable us to accomplish 
within two years our tasks in the air and 
on the ocean (defeat of the Royal Navy and 
RAF), with the manpower and material resources 
at our disposal,^® 
Hitler's motives for the invasion of the Soviet Union could 
thus be given as: a desire to attack Russia before she 
attacked him; the wish to deprive Great Britain of one of 
her remaining diplomatic-military weapons, i.e., the threat 
to Germany of a two front war with the Russians forming the 
new front; the "clash of ideologies" as propounded by Hitler; 
and the desire to gain living space for Germany's surplus 
population and to extend his New Order over the rich lands 
of Eastern Europe. The oil of south Russia and the agri­
culture of the Ukraine would have been great boons to the 
1 ̂  
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German war effort against Britain when the time for the 
drive West came once again. 
This was his plan. Taetically, it was well thought 
out and the Fuehrer believed in its success. Intelligence 
reports, as recorded by Haider, showed the Russians to be 
defeatable; that they would fall, even though they resisted, 
before the might of a summer blitzkrieg. As Hitler once 
stated before the war, "I shall advance (toward world con-
, 17 
quest) step by step. Never two steps at once." The 
strategy of Russia first and Great Britain second did make 
sense—but only if Russia could be defeated in a lightning 
summer campaign and only if the U. S. A. did take four years 
to get it production up to an important wartime level, and 
only if the British did not succeed in becoming too powerful 
in the air and on the sea. 
Shortly after the invasion of the Soviet Unionj the 
Russian armies west of the Dvina and the Dnieper had been 
scattered. Soviet forces were reeling under the impact of 
the German blow. Haider wrote with genuine sincerity: 
It is probably no overstatement to say that 
the Russian campaign had been won in the 
space of two weeks. Of course, this does 
not yet mean that it is closed. The sheer 
geographical vastness of the country and 
the stubbornness of the resistance, which 
is carried on with all means, will claim our 
efforts for many more weeks to come.^® 
1 ̂  
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Those "weeks to come" mentioned by Haider turned 
into months and then into years. And the campaign was never 
'Vron." Yet at that time the general had good reason, tacti­
cally if not strategically, to feel that he was making a 
factual statement of truth. For it indeed appeared that the 
Russians were beaten and that by fall the occupation of the 
Soviet Union would be well under way. Then, of course, by 
the spring or perhaps the summer of 1942, the greatly expanded 
and stronger Reich could commence its campaign against the 
all-but-beaten British. Their last remaining hope, the United 
States, would still be two or three years away from a war 
production level of importance, and would undoubtedly be 
overawed at seeing German troops and guns in eastern Siberia 
opposite the Alaskan coast. Such a situation, combined 
with the powerful Japanese threat in the Pacific» would be 
enough to keep the Americans from entering the war. And 
Great Britain would stand alone. 
Ill 
The two periods of the first year of the war in the 
West, June to October of 1940 and October, 1940, to June, 
1941, have already been discussed (see Chapter IV). The 
reasons for the German failure to invade Spain and Gibral­
tar for those thirteen months have been set forth. The 
next "period", that from June, 1941, to the Allied inva­
sion of France in 1944, is of interest in so far as it 
illustrated the factors affecting the German decision not 
to invade Spain and Gibraltar during those years. 
Due to the opening of the Eastern Front in June, 
1941J and the military diversion in the Balkans just before 
it J the possibility of conducting any campaign on the Iberian 
Peninsula was all but nil. Hitler ordered that the war in 
the West could be carried on in so far as necessary to pro­
tect the continent from invasion or to drive the British 
out of Africa, but it was the war in the East in which he 
hoped to win the "Battle of Decision." It was in the East, 
felt flitlerj that the war would be won or lost. 
And it was in the East that the Fuehrer made his 
greatest effort. By the end of 1942, troops and supplies 
were going mainly to Russia. Rommelp commanding the German 
forc©s in Africa, felt the lack of troops and supplies to 
19 
be the main factor in his defeat. For the great bulk of 
German men and material was going Eastj into "Moloch Russia." 
The attack on the Soviet Union, known as Operation 
Barbarossa, was first scheduled to take place on May 15, 
20 
1941, The Wehrmacht was on that day to begin the destruc­
tion of Soviet armed forces, to occupy the land, and to 
"crush and annihilate" the Communist government and ideology. 
But the attack did not take place on May 15. It had to be 
1 Q 
Rommel, p. 280, 318, 360, 363-4, 484, 487. 
^^Bengtson, 72. 
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postponed for over a month because of the unexpected Balkan 
campaign J the result of the Duce's meddling in Albania and 
Greece. 
Mussolini had earlier informed the Fuehrer that he 
was going to fight a "parallel War." By this he meant that 
Italy would fight the same enemies as the Reichs, but without 
closely connecting her actions to those of the Wehrmacht. 
On October 19, 1940, the Duce wrote Hitler to inform him 
that Italy planned to launch an attack on Greece. The 
Fuehrer was at this time in France, on his way to Hendaye 
for the conference with Franco on the 23rd. On the 24th 
the Duce's letter caught up with him. Hitler was not 
pleased. He did not want the Balkans disturbed and he 
feared a British invasion of the Greek islands^ particu­
larly of Leainos s from which bombers could reach the Rumanian 
oil fields. He quickly travelled to Florence where he tried 
to dissuade the Duce from the invasion. Mussolini, delighted 
with his trick and the fact that for once the Fuehrer was 
begging him for something, reported to Hitler that the 
operation had begun and could not be stopped. General Jodlj 
who was traveling with the Fuehrer, said "we arrived just a 
21 
few hours too late," 
Hitler, of course, was vexed, and Mussolini soon 
realized that he had committed a blunder. The Greeks 
^^Admiral Raymond DeBelot, The Struggle for the 
Mediterranean 1939-1945 (Princeton, N, J.s Princeton 
University Press, 1951). p. 77 
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actually drove the Italians back across the Albanian border 
at many points. By December of 1940, the Italians were in 
such a state that Mussolini told Ciano: 
There is nothing else to do« This is 
grotesque and absurd, but it is a fact. 
We have to ask for a truce (with the 
Greeks) through Hitler.^^ 
Ciano wrote that the shame was almost too much. "I would 
rather," he said, "put a bullet through my head than tele-
23 
phone Ribbentropi" 
At this same time, Yugoslavia approached the Italians 
with the offer of an alliance. Hitler, who had been con­
cerned over the failure of the Italians in Greece, changed 
his mood when Rome informed him of the possibility of an 
alliance with the government in Belgrade. Although the 
Italians had appealed in December, 1940, for German inter­
vention—^diplomatic or military—the Fuehrer had then 
24 
informed them that he could do nothing until March. But 
now he responded to that appeal and planned an attack on 
Greece through his new allies of Rumania and Bulgaria while 
Yugoslavia remained passive. The alliance with Belgrade 
was successfully concluded, and on March 25, 1941, Yugo­
slavia joined the Axis. On the very next day, March 26, 
General Simovic and his anti-fascist followers brought 
^^Ciano, 318. 
Ibid. 
^^Ibid«, 326. 
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off a coup d'etat in Belgrade; in Hitler's opinion this 
meant that Yugoslavia did not intend to abide by her one-
day old alliance with the Axis. He decided, without even 
waiting to be contacted by the new government in Belgrade, 
to liquidate Yugoslavia, Labeled Operation Marita, this 
action had been in preparation for some months and had as 
its objective the defeat and occupation of Greece, It was 
now quickly expanded to include Yugoslavia. Thus, on April 
6, 1941, Hitler struck without warning. German troops that 
had been amassed in the east for the Russian offensive were 
ordered to strike to the south. 
The war in the Balkans was one of speed, a blitz­
krieg. The Greeks were unable to stop the German advance, 
even with the aid of the British who sent some troops from 
North Africa. By April 19, the king in Athens recognized 
the hopelessness of the situation and ordered the Greeks 
to aid the British in their evacuation. By the 27th the 
entire mainland was in German or Italian hands. Yugoslavia 
had capitulated on the 17th, Only Crete remained, and it 
was taken in a savage battle the last week in May, after 
heavy expenditure of Luftwaffe aircraft and paratroops. 
In two months it was all over. 
The Balkan campaign is Important because it delayed 
the start of Operation Barbarossa and placed a great strain 
on the already thinly-spread Wehrmacht, Although the 
fighting had been brief and successful, many of the divisions 
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diverted to the Balkan peninsula had to be moved back to 
their original jumping-off places for Operation Barbarossa, 
This movement itself took a great toll of fuel and equip-
25 
ment. And the troops, after two months of battle, were 
now to be thrown into the vastness of Russia, because there 
26 
were not enough reserves to relieve them. Many of the 
Panzer units needed a thorough overhaul and partial re-
equipment after their battles and long treks over the Greek 
27 
mountains. But even more, the Balkan campaign took troops 
from all over Europe, especially in the East, and rendered 
the possibility of any action in the West out of the ques­
tion. It weakened the Wehrmacht. Haider best stated the 
situation in his entry for April 5 in which he wrote that 
the conduct of the campaign was dictated by; 
political considerations, and what is more, 
considerations of a purely transitory 
character. This precludes any planning 
with clear goals and harbors the danger 
of dissipating our strength in a series 
of isolated operations, 
IV 
The German Wehrmacht was dissipating its strengths 
As early as June, 1940, before the proposed invasion of 
Haider, VI, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 130. 
2 6 
Seymour Feidin and William Richardson (ed.) The 
Fatal Decisions (New York; William Sloan and Associates, 
1956> p. 43. 
27 
Haider, VI, 134-6, 
28-,. ,  .J _„ 
Ibid., 53, 
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England, it was obvious that the German military suffered 
from a critical lack of siege artillery, motorized trans­
port, tracked vehicles, command unity, and respect for the 
combative will of other peoples. As was shown (see Chapter 
IV), the Wehrmacht in 1940-1941 was in no position in terms 
of men and materiel to invade Great Britain, let alone en­
gage in a simultaneous operation on the Iberian Peninsula. 
With the beginning of the Russian campaign in June, and even 
before when the 'Wehrmacht moved into the Balkans in April, 
the supply and manpower situation was such that to have en­
gaged in a campaign on the Iberian peninsula was impossible. 
According to Haider, the Wehrmacht found itself 
29 
"extremely weak when compared with the Russians" on 
March 25, 1941. It was his belief that the divisions would 
arrive in the East in such numbers as to eliminate "all 
danger." But when the date for the invasion came, the 
Wehrmacht could count only 141 German divisions matched 
30 
against 213 Russian divisionso This tremendous superiority 
of numbers in the Russian forces seemed to cause the Wehr­
macht no great concern. According to Generals Bodenschatz 
and Milch the Luftwaffe was not prepared for the Russian 
31 
war—and would not have been ready until 1943 or 1944. 
29 
Haider, VI, 35, 
^^Ibid.. 160 
31 
Bartz, 103. 
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In November, 1940, after the cancellation of Sea Lion, 
German troops were withdrawn from the West and sent to 
Rumania. Haider noted that upwards of 10 divisions left 
32 
for the East. A little later he wrote that the diversion 
of military strength to outlying areas was going to restrict 
33 
any major campaign. This, of course, was obvious, and 
was one reason why an invasion of Spain never took place. 
The Balkan campaign, served as an examples of this "diver­
sion," and was not approved of by Halderi 
Other signs of the Wehrmacht's material strain were 
evident. For example, about 500 planes were used by the 
Luftwaffe in the conquest of Crete. Of these 250 were 
damaged and 130 destroyed. When the invasion of the Soviet 
Union began one month later, the Luftwaffe eould put into 
34 
the air 320 planes for Operation Barbarossa, In other 
words, the invasion of the little island of Crete received 
more air support than did the invasion of the Soviet Union 
in the initial stage. The reason, in part, was that para­
troops were used on Crete. And the parachute divisions of 
the Luftwaffe had suffered high casualties as well, so high 
that the invasion of Crete was the last big paratroop opera-
35 
tlon on the part of the Wehrmacht in the war. 
^^alder, V, 21. 
^^Ibid.. 43. 
^^Ibid.. YI, 142, 
^^Ibid., 35, 37. 
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All in all, the Wehrmacht in 1941 did not possess 
the ability to invade Russia with the force that it had 
used against Poland two years before, let alone conduct a 
simultaneous peninsular campaign. It was charged with 
garrisoning and defending Europe from the north of Norway 
to the south of France, thence east to the Greek Islands 
and north to the forests of Finland, It was fighting in 
Africa and in Russia. In terms of the economy of forces, 
it was simply too much. To add to all of this a peninsular 
campaign against Spanish and possibly British forces would 
have been catastrophic, as was clearly evident to the Wehr­
macht and to the Fuehrer. The pet project of Admiral Raeder 
(the drive through Spain, across North Africa, over the Suez, 
and into the Near East) was flatly turned down by the Fuehrer 
in 1941. According to Alan Bullock; 
he (Raeder) soon came to realize and later 
admitted that Hitler was not interested in 
a major offensive in the southern theater, 
that he had no intention of diverting suf­
ficient forces away from his proposed 
Russian campaign to be able to achieve any­
thing effective in this area.^® 
By 1942, Rommel was fighting desperately in North 
Africa, yet he never received enough men and materiel to 
give him an equal chance of success against the British, 
In order to aid Rommel, the capture of Malta, the British 
strong-point in the central Mediterranean, was necessary, 
^^Bullock, 551. 
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But by 1942 it was too late for such an attack, for the 
Luftwaffe had been absorbed by the requirements of the Eastern 
37 
Front. In April, 1942, Kesselring had to announce that the 
pressure on the Russian Front forced the OKW to withdraw a 
38 
large portion of the Luftwaffe units based in Sicily. And 
perhaps most striking of all, the OKW had recognized the 
problem even as it was developing, and had announced back 
in February of 1941 that:; "It is clear that in view of 
Operations Marita and Barbarossa the troops held in reserve 
for Operation Felix will have to be used in the new under­
takings.'*^^ 
In considering the years after 1942, i.e.j, during 
the great Soviet offensives of '43 and '44, it is unnecessary 
to explain the German inability to muster sufficient forces 
and materiel for a campaign in the Iberian peninsula. It is 
common knowledge that the Fuehrer did not possess enough 
men and materiel to fight on his existing fronts, let alone 
on a new one. 
Thus, Ciano was right. In attacking the Soviet Union 
Hitler had indeed opened "a hemorrhage of incalculable conse­
quences." And with that "hemorrhage" and the months of 
preparation and diversion before it, there existed another 
^"^DeBelot, 157. 
^®Ibld. 
^®IMd. 
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reason not to invade the Iberian peninsula. That reason can 
best be stated Economy of Forces; Eastern Front. 
CHAPTER VI 
Economy of Forcesr Southern Front 
"No longer (in 1943) could we carry the burden 
of three fronts. ...Only with great difficulty 
and by using our last reserves have we been 
able to improvise new fronts, both east'^and 
west. The sky over Germany has grown very 
dark." 
Erwin Rommel, 
writing on the economy 
of forces. Summer of 1944, 
In 1939-40, the British government became concerned 
over the expansionist policies of Mussolini and the creation 
of a potent Italian navy and air force. This concern had 
existed in London for some time, but by 1940 the problem had 
reached such a degree that there existed a threat of an armed 
division of the Mediterranean into two parts, if the Italians 
so willed. The Mediterranean would then no longer be an arm 
of the Atlantic and an avenue of British policy. Indeed, it 
was feared that it might become an Italian lake. 
The British had attempted to prepare for such an event, 
By 1940, their military strength in North Africa and the Near 
East was not great, but was at least recognizable. In June 
of that year, the British army counted 36,000 men in Egypt, 
27,000 in Palestine, 9,000 in the Sudan, 8,500 in Kenya, and 
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1,500 in Somaliland,^ Obviously, these forces did not possess 
the strength necessary to wage an African war. All these 
forces were without much heavy equipment, no formation was 
completely outfitted, and their weakness in anti-aircraft 
and anti-tank armament was serious. The Royal Air Force in 
North Africa and the Near East had only about a hundred 
machines of obsolete types, and another hundred planes of 
2 
more serviceable character. Despite this materiel weakness, 
however, the British forces in the summer of 1940 were ready 
and willing to fight their new enemy, the Italians. 
The most potent British strength in the Mediterranean 
and Near East in 1940 was provided by the Royal Navy. In 
aircraft carriers and battleships, the British were superior 
to their enemies, although the Axis at that time possessed 
a slight lead in escort and small battle craft. In the 
Mediterranean there were two British aircraft carriers, five 
battleships, one battle cruiser, five light cruisers, two 
destroyer flotillas, and eight submarines. Although the sea 
was seriously threatened by the Italians, the Mediterranean 
3 
was still for the most part in British hands. 
This seems all the more remarkable when one remembers 
the multiplicity of dangers which faced the British in that 
^Raymond DeBelot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean, 
1939-1945 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1951) p. 60. 
^Ibid. 
3 
Alanbrooke, 194-6. See also DeBelot, 61, 
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summer of 1940. They had to wage war on three separate 
fronts:"^ on the oceans in defense of their trade routes, in 
the Channel to protect the home Islands against a threatened 
invasion, and in the Mediterranean, where they were outnumbered 
by the Italians on land, on sea, and in the air (see Chapter 
I), Although the immediate dangers on the Channel and ocean 
fronts were the most pressing, loss of the Mediterranean 
would have been in the long run hardly less fatal. The 
British knew this, and thus did what they could to prepare 
for the defense of the area. 
But, by the end of June, 1940, after the fall of 
France and during the height of German preparations for 
Operation Sea Lion, the British position in the Mediterranean 
area did not appear to be very good. The threat of invasion 
of the home islands served to deplete the Medxterranean 
fleets, and Lord Alanbrooke wrote; 
.,,Malta was left an isolated outpost.and 
Gibraltar was dominated by the guns of Franco's 
Spain, It was scarecely surprising that most 
of the American Service Chiefs regarded 
Britain at this time as a bad risk. The 
French High Command (in Vichy).predicted 
that within three weeks Britain's neck would 
be 'wrung like a chicken's®. 
The British were, however, just as Hitler had once 
said, **tough". The Eastern Mediterranean Fleet, under the 
command of Admiral Andrew Cunningham, was able to establish 
'^Alanbrooke, 150. 
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5 
from the very start of the war such a "moral ascendancy" 
over the Italian sea forces that, despite their central 
position and naval air power, the Italians were unable to 
prevent the British from holding Malta and even passing 
occasional convoys through the Sicilian Narrows to reinforce 
Egypt and reassure Greece and Turkey. The German navy at the 
outbreak of the war was in no way capable of challenging the 
British control of the Mediterranean, Owing to their great 
numerical inferiority, German surface forces could not hope 
to penetrate the Mediterranean, and the German submarines 
were fully occupied in the Atlantic, 
II 
In November, 1940, the Italians struck at Greece 
across the Adriatic (see Chapter V), Cunningham was able 
not only to protect the Greek archipelago and islands from 
immediate Italian invasion, but also to launch torpedo-
carrying aircraft against the Italian fleet in Taranto 
harbor and thus sink or immobilize three of Italy's six 
battleships. The balance of sea power in the Mediterranean 
was transformed in the course of a single night. 
A month later Marshal Graziani, furiously prodded by 
the impatient Duce, began to move eastward with his long, 
strung-out battle army of nearly a quarter of a million men 
^Alanbrooke, 150. 
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to occupy Alexandria and thus deprive the British navy of its 
base. ''Never," wrote Ciano of his country's generals and 
their reluctance to advance against the British, "has a 
military operation been undertaken so much against the will 
6 
of the commanders." General O'Connor, backed by the daring 
and ability of a few RAF squadrons, fell on the Italian 
advance guard at Sidi Barrani, and with one weak armored 
division recently arrived from England and a single Indian 
infantry division proceeded to destroy the Italian advance 
forces and drive back the invasion. At the same time General 
Wavell launched his attack upon the Italians in Eritrea and 
Abyssinia. 
The attacking Italian forces under Marshall Graziani 
were quickly checked and forced to retreat. The troops under 
O'Connor had more trouble trying to keep up with the routed 
Fascists than in fighting them. In a campaign conducted five 
to six hundred miles from his base and sustained by captured 
enemy transport, O'Connor overwhelmed the Italians in 
Cyrenaica and parts of the middle Libyan plain. The Italian 
7 
African army of 341,000 men reeled under the impact of the 
British coimter-offensive. And although the opportunity 
afforded by this tremendous campaign—of driving on to 
Tripoli and, by securing air bases, of restoring Britain's 
®Ciano, 291. 
7 
Rommel, 91. 
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control of the central Mediterranean—was subsequently thrown 
away in order to send an expeditionary force to Greece (see 
Chapters I, II, and V), its Impact and that of Cunningham's 
naval victories had a profound effect on not only Italian 
8 
morale, but on Turkish and Spanish opinion as well. 
At an early date in the war the German Wehrmacht 
had made an offer, with certain selfish conditions attached 
9 
to it, to send forces to the Mediterranean theater. In 
Directive No. 18 of November 12, 1940, (the same Directive 
ordering the preparation of Operation Felix) Hitler stateds 
Intervention of German forces is not envisaged 
(in Africa) until after the Italians reach 
Mersa Matruh. Even then the Luftwaffe will 
be employed only if the Italians place the 
necessary bases at our disposal. 
The Fuehrer ordered that the ffehrmacht hold one armored divi­
sion in readiness for transport to North Africa, and ordered 
the navy and the Luftwaffe to prepare for transport duties, 
and the bombing of the Suez respectively. Haider noted on 
November 14, two days after the Directive was issued, that 
the Third Armored Divisdon "will continue to stand by for 
Libya." 
Q 
Alanbrooke, 197, 
^DeBelot, 93, 
l^Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI, 960. 
llHalder, V, 21. 
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The Italians wished to restrict German assistance to 
the shipment of supplies. They were at that time yet to feel 
the crushing weight of O'Connor's counter-offensive. Musso­
lini stated: "If the Germans ever get here, they will never 
12 
go home," He had by this time begun to realize that he was 
no longer an equal partner in this alliance and on his instruc­
tions Badoglio had refused Keitel's offer to send self-con-
13 
tained German units to Africa. But by the time O'Connor 
had captured 130,000 Italian prisoners, 400 tanks and 850 
guns, and had driven the Duce's forces all the way back to 
the middle of Libya, Mussolini was not only forced to accept 
but actually had to beg for help from Hitler at a time when 
assistance would like rescue—which it most assuredly was. 
Ill 
In his diary entry for December 21, 1940, Ciano 
noted that the Germans were then considering the Italian 
position and the request for assistance. He wrote that two 
armored divisions were proposed as the forces to be sent to 
14 
Libya. General Haider noted two days later in his War 
Journal that Italy was to receive raw materials and arms 
15 
for two divisions. On December 24 he wrote that the 
l^DeBelot, 93. 
^^Ibid. 
^'^Ciano, 326. 
1 
Haider, V, 80. 
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16 
beleaguered Italians were making "insane demands for arms," 
Haider felt that the Wehrmaeht, even in those happy days of 
1940, did not possess the materiel strength to meet the 
"insane" Italian demands. On January 16, he wrote that the 
Wehrmaeht was having "difficulties" securing armored reeon-
17 
naissance ears for Libya. These vehicles, he noted, would 
be ready by February 10 at the very earliest. Once again 
the lack of wheeled and tracked transport in the German army 
was evident. 
During December, 1940, and January, 1941, the Tenth 
German Air Fleet, known to the Italians as "X Gat" (Corpo 
aero tedesco), moved into Italy and was stationed on the 
airfield of Reggio Calabria, and on the Sicilian airfields 
at Catonia, Comiso, Trapani, and Palermo. This force possessed 
a strength of about four hundred aircraft, including ME 110's 
18 
and Stuka dive-bombers. In March of 1941 some Heinkel Ill's 
were added. The Tenth Air Fleet, however, had no torpedo 
planes, a fact which was to prove disadvantagious to the Axis 
and a boon to the Royal Navy. 
At last. In January, 1941, the Fuehrer decided to move 
military forces to Libya to aid the Italians and to stabilize 
the situation. These forces were to be kept comparatively 
^®Halder, V, 83. 
^''^Ibid.. 85. 
^®DeBelot, 94. 
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small in size so as to avoid placing too great a strain on 
the Wehrmacht and weakening its build-up for the coming 
Eastern offensive. Only two divisions and one Panzer regi­
ment were to be sent. Haider wrote on January 20 that 
General Funck was to be the commander of the African forces 
of the Wehrmacht, and that those forces were to leave by 
19 
February IGth, with their supplies going ahead of them. 
By February 27, the British encountered their first opposi­
tion from German patrols on the Libyan desert. It very 
quickly became obvious that the Germans of the Afrika Korps 
were of quite a different character than the Italians. 
It appears that Haider was wrong when he wrote that 
General Funck would command the German forces in Libya. 
Rommel wrote that he was instructed on February 6 by Field 
Marshal von Brauchitsch to take command of the German Afrika 
Korps, and that he was "to move off as soon as possible to 
20 
Libya to reconnoitre the situation," The middle of 
February, according to Rommel, saw the first arrival of 
German troops in Africa—the Fifth Light Division—and by 
mid-April all troops of that divisioawere in Africa. By 
March 11, the Fifth Panzer Regiment had completed its dis­
embarkation at Tripoli, and the Fifteenth Panzer Division 
was move in toto by mid-May, 
19 
Haider, V, 89. 
20 
Rommel, 98. 
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On March 31, Ronunel hegan his advance against the 
British. Although he himself called it "the raid through 
Gyrenaica," the Axis offensive in Libya in 1941 is often 
called "Rommel's first offensive." Erwin Eommel, who was 
in command of the German-Italian forces in Libya, was under 
the orders of General Gariboldi of the Italian Commando 
Supremo in Borne. According to a written agreement between 
Italy and Germany, Rommel could appeal to the OKW in the 
event that the instructions received from the Italians were 
unacceptable. But in Libya Rommel's personality soon came 
to be the dominant factor, not only with the Germans and 
Italians, but with the British as well. Rommel was person­
ally popular with Hitler—he was the Fuehrer's "general in 
the sun." He rapidly gained overriding influence in Axis 
councils and frequently bypassed his Italian commanders by 
dealing directly with the OKW, After the first successes, 
namely the drive through Cyrenaica all the way to Solium 
on the Egyptian-Libyan border, nothing could stand against 
his influence. 
Thus, the term "Rommel's offensive" is in fact 
justified, for without Rommel there would have most likely 
been no offensive. And it was that offensive that served 
to turn the African war into a major campaign for the 
Wehrmacht, a third front to be fought for and on which to 
spend and even squander men and precious material. It was 
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tlie African campaign that served as another factor in the 
German decision not to invade the Iherian Peninsula. 
By May, 1941, the German Wehrmacht was engaged in a 
full-scale drive to conquer Africa, with over 30,000 men and 
hundreds of tanks, to say nothing of the Tenth Air Fleet in 
Italy and Sicily and subordinate Luftwaffe units in Africa. 
By November the African Campaign had taken on such propor­
tions that the OKW was forced to regard it as a major front. 
IV 
Just as in Operation Sea Lion the previous fall, the 
transport situation in the spring of 1941 was very critical, 
especially sea transport. According to Haider six German 
ships were needed to transport supplies to the Italians 
22 
alone during January. By the 2l3t of that month the 
German railway service was running twelve trains a day over 
the Brenner Pass to Maples, but the navy could only handle 
six a day. Thus, wrote Haider, since 110 train loads of 
Afrika Korps supplies were to be ferried across, the Italian-
German convoys would require at least 45 days to load and 
unload, to say nothing of the time required to cross the sea. 
But the most interesting aspect of all the War Journal 
entries for this period. Spring, 1941, is that while Haider 
lamented the shortage of transport and supplies for Eommel, 
^^Halder, V, 86. 
^^Ibid.. 91. 
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he spent a great deal more time noting the preparations for 
the coming invasion of the USSR, and from April to May the 
"Blitzkrieg" in the Balkans. In other words, with the coming 
of June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht found itself engaged (as 
planned) with the Russians, occupying the recently conquered 
Balkans (unplanned), and conducting a major campaign (unplanned) 
in the south under Rommel. This latter front, as Rommel 
himself bitterly complained, was ignored as much as possible 
by the OKW and OKH; 
I was not very happy at the efforts of Field 
Marshal von Brauchitsch and Colonel-General 
Franz Haider to keep down the numbers of 
troops sent to Africa and to leave the future 
of this theatre of war to chance, 
On November 7-8, 1942, Operation Torch—the Allied 
invasion of North Africa—began. Units of the United States 
Army, Navy, and Air Force, together with British troops 
supported by the RAF, landed simultaneously at numerous 
points on the North African coast. So gigantic was the 
Allied invasion that it was transported in a convoy of 500 
25 
ships and escorted by 350 more. The invasion was, of 
course, a serious threat to the Axis position in Libya. Not 
only would Rommel have to fight the British to the east, but 
now also the Americans to the west. 
^^Rommel, 106. 
25 
Chronology of the Second World War, (London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1947.) p. 151. 
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With the greatest effort, and by stripping many 
occupation garrisons to the absolute minimum, reserves were 
sent to Africa. Gn November 9 German troops began arriving 
at El Aouana airport outside of funis. It is to the credit 
of the German Luftwaffe that this rapid and surprising 
reinforcement took place. Troop-carrying aircraft flew 
constantly between the continent and Tunis. At its peak 
26 
the airlift was bringing in 1,000 men or more a day. But 
once again the tremendous efforts of the German military 
were in vain. The number of troops brought to Africa was 
not large enough to counter the overwhelming superiority of 
the Allies. And supplies, so critically needed, remained 
as short as ever. 
And what is more, with the Allied invasion of North 
Africa the Nazis discarded the Vichy regime and Vichy-France 
was occupied by German troops on November 11, placing yet 
another burden on a weakened and faltering Wehrmacht. The 
end of 1942 saw the German military machine fighting for its 
life in the south, attempting to crush growing resistance 
movements in the Balkans and in the West, and in the East 
feverishly preparing for the catastrophic winter of 1942-43, 
the winter of Stalingrad. 
The history of the Afrika Korps and its defeat at 
the hands of the Anglo-American forces in 1942-43 is beyond 
2®Fuller, 243. 
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the scope of this thesis. Suffice it to say that the war in 
Africa served as a further tax on the Wehrmacht's strength, 
as well as a further reason not to attempt an invasion and 
occupation of the Itoerian Peninsula. As in the case of the 
West (Chapter IV) and the East (Chapter V), the Wehrmacht 
did not have the necessary men, transport, nor supplies to 
sustain its existing fronts, much less a new one. 
Rommel held that one of the main, if not the main, 
reasons that Africa fell to the Allies was the lack of 
materiel and fresh reserves of troops. By the end of 1941 
27 
he was writing of convoys that never came and Allied 
aircraft that flew unopposed—-for the Luftwaffe, as shown in 
28 
Chapter V, "had been absorbed by the Eastern Front," Rommel 
himself best summed up the situation: 
Anyone who has to fxght, even wxth the most 
modern weapons, against an enemy in complete 
command of the air, fights like a savage 
against modern European troops, under the 
same handicaps and with the same chances of 
success,^® 
How can one fight a war with one eye on the enemy 
and the other on the gas gauge? This, of course, was another 
of Rommel's supply problems, and one that he lamented most 
30 
bitterly. So bad was the German position in Africa, so 
27 
Rommel, 234, 521, 287. 
28 
DeBelot, 157, 
29 
Rommel, 285. 
Ibid., 333, 354-5, 278-9, 280. 
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short were the numbers of men and sorely needed supplies, 
that a saddened Rommel wrote just before his death in 1944; 
Colonel-General Haider told me in 1941 that 
the Army High Command regarded North Africa 
as a lost cause and that they were setting 
the German troops no other task but to 
delay the collapse of Italian resistance 
in Libya for as long as possible. Herr 
Haider asserted.•.that it would be impos­
sible to keep an army of more than two or 
three divisions supplies in North Africa 
for long.31 
Thus, the war in Africa served as another drain on 
a bleeding Wehrmacht, or in a more mundane context, its 
"ulcer," just as the Peninsular War of 1809-12 was 
Napoleon's, North Africa was the "ignored" front, and yet 
it too took away men and materiel. It too made an invasion 
of the Iberian Peninsula out of the question, for the 
Wehrmacht knew that such an invasion would be still-born in 
the light of the Economy of Forces; Southern Ftont. 
CHAPTER VII 
Zuruckblicken 
"Thou Shalt make casteIs than in Spayne, 
And dreme of joye, al but in vayne," 
Goeffrey Chaucer, 
Romaunt of the Rose. B. 1,, 
2573. 
I 
In his work Chief of Intelligence« Ian Colvin gives 
what is perhaps the best statement of the problem, and the 
answers to it, that make up this thesis; 
On the white cliffs of Dover, the sands of 
El.Alamein, and the banks of the Volga at 
Stalingrad there are monuments to three turn­
ing pbints of the Second World War, where 
the flood of Hitler's fire and steel was 
stemmed and turned back. But if our grand­
children ask why it was that Hitler stopped 
at the Pyrenees and how Spain remained neutral 
against all historical likelihood, there is 
no simple answer that we can give them.l 
There is no simple answer. Why Hitler did not invade 
Spain, and with it the strategic bastion of Gibraltar, can­
not be explained with one or two or even several well 
constructed reasons. The answers put forth in this thesis 
are not offered as the only 'or the complete explanations 
to that question. Rather, the major factors which helped 
^Colvin, 124, 
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shape the German decision are given here in what might be 
called points of consideration, aspects of research that 
offer some insight into one of the most enigmatic turning 
points of the war. 
What are these factors, these "aspects" of research? 
Why did the Germans not strike against Spain? Military 
scientists and historians may conclude that Hermann Goering 
was correct in stating that the failure of the Wehrmacht 
to do so was perhaps the most fatal blunder of the war. 
But, despite all the gains that were calculated to result 
from such a campaign (see Chapter l), the prospect offered 
too many deterrents and too many grave risks. First there 
was the awful specter of a peninsular war. With the British 
strong enough, and fervent enough, to fight in Norway, Greece, 
and Africa it could not be doubted that they would intervene 
in any action on the Iberian peninsula, especially since that 
action would be a direct threat to Gibraltar. British suc­
cesses in Africa proved only too well their ability to make 
such intervention harmful to a thinly-spread Wehrmacht. 
Then there was the added factor of Spanish resistance, 
or more correctly, guerilla warfare. The Wehrmacht would 
have had to assume the enormous additional responsibility of 
occupying the Iberian peninsula with its long, jagged coast­
line, It simultaneously would have had to fight the British 
and suppress the Spaniards, The appearance of Naszi forces 
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would have quickly set off nation-wide explosions in a country 
rife with hatreds and superlatively skilled in the art of 
guerilla warfare. 
Nor would the task of seizing and occupying Spain 
have been an easy one. Transportation would have been a grave 
problem, for Spanish railroads were of different gauge from 
the French, were badly disorganized, and rolling stock was 
2 
scarce and antiquated. The Irun bridge, which was of such 
concern to Haider, was a good example of the tremendous 
transport problem. 
The supplying of the invading forces would have been 
another difficult matter, as there was not enough food in 
Spain to allow an occupying army to live off the land, and 
lines of supply from France to the north, which could pass 
through the Pyrenees at only a few well known points (see 
Chapter II) would have been easy targets for guerilla units 
3 
or British bombers. Thus, the prospect of a long and bloody 
peninsular war may be said to stand as one factor upon which 
the decision not to invade Spain was taken. 
Another factor is that of the "faQade"-=>the ideological 
edifice that Hitler would have preserved. Closely connected 
with this was his personal liking for the Spanish people, 
his desire, simply stated, not to offend them. The Fuehrer 
2 
United States Department of State, Documents on German 
Foreign Policy, series D (Washington D, C,; United States 
Government Printing Office, 1957), Vol, X, p. 444-5, 
3 
Ibid. 
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realized that the invasion of one member of his New Order 
by another would bring the whole concept crashing round his 
ears, and he did everything possible to avoid such a catas­
trophe, When Italy left the war in 1943, for example, 
Hitler ordered that Mussolini be rescued and established 
as the ruler of fascist North Italy. Hitler could not, 
he would not, allow his grand ideological fagade to be 
destroyed. Spain's prestige with the Fuehrer, his genuine 
liking of the "Nordic" Spaniards, only strengthened his 
conviction that such an invasion would be a danger to and 
in complete contradiction of the entire concept of the 
New Order. 
Spain was fascist, but also neutral. Hitler the 
politician recognized the danger that such an invasion would 
bring. He knew that he could not afford to panic Turkey 
into a dependence on Russia or England, and feared that the 
invasion of a neutral state after two or more years of war 
might cause ore-rich Sweden to adopt a hostile attitude. 
Whether or not Turkey and Sweden would have viewed such an 
invasion with alarm is difficult to say. But the Fuehrer 
felt that he could not risk it. Nor could he risk the 
alarming of his newly won "allies"; Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Rumania, the strife-torn Czechoslovakia, Finland, and the 
subservient but still potentially powerful Vichy-France. 
Hitler needed their space and their manpower, their oil and 
their industry. He did not want to see his organized Europe 
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crumble—even theoretically. He did not want his "allies" 
to possess any attitude but one of affability, tempered 
with respect. He could not afford to be bothered with 
revolts and the noxious problems that would result, espe­
cially that of occupation. And he liked the Spaniards'. 
The above reasons or explanations are theoretical. 
We do not know that England would have intervened on the 
Iberian peninsula had the Wehrmacht launched an offensive 
across the Pyrenees. We only have Churchill's order that 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff "consider the possibility of 
4 
alternative action on the Iberian peninsula." 
It cannot be held that Hitler's "liking" of the 
Spanish people alone would have stayed his hand. After 
all, he said that he liked the Greeks, admired them, and 
yet he invaded Greece, We cannot say that Spain would 
have resisted an invasion by Germany, especially before 
1943, but we have Hitler's words that "they (the Spanish 
5 
people)...would carry on guerrilla war(fare) in our rear." 
All these answers may not be factually or historically 
correct, but they are important. For it was the thinking 
of the Fuehrer that decided the Iberian issue as it was his 
decision to make. 
4 
Alanbrooke, 339. 
5 
Martienssen, 172. 
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It cannot be held that Germany's allies would have 
been alarmed at the invasion of Spain and Portugal by the 
Wehrmacht, or that the neutral states, particularly Sweden 
and Turkey, would have been panicked into action of one sort 
or another. Yet Hitler the politician felt that he could 
not endanger his "system" of alliances nor burden Germany 
with more fighting and occupation duties, especially as the 
invasion of Russia demanded all of his country's efforts, 
to say nothing of the previous preparations for the invasion 
of Britain, the fighting in North Africa, and the war in the 
Balkans. 
These explanations, then, are theoretical in that 
they never took place. They are hot historical facts, 
Spain was not invaded, and we will never know if the 
Fuehrer's logic was correct. But even if these explanations 
are not historical facts they are realities, concrete expla­
nations, in so far as they affected Hitler's thinking and 
that of his military chiefs, 
II 
There are additional reasons, however, that if not 
"simple," are less theoretical than the above. These may 
be stated as the Economy of Forces—the axiom of military 
science that at any given time only so much can be done 
with so many troops and so many guns in so many places. 
In the West from June, 1940, until October, 1940, the 
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Wehrmacht was busily preparing for Ope ration Sea Lion, the 
invasion of the British Isles. This tremendous offensive 
was to require all available strength and precluded the 
\ 
engagement of forces in any other major campaign. Besides, 
if the British Isles were forced to surrender, Gibraltar 
would most likely have become an automatic prize of war. 
From October until June of the next year (1941), 
after the cancellation of Operation Sea Lion, preparations 
were in progress for the Eastern Offensive. Hitler hoped 
to find in Russia his badly needed "Battle of Decision," 
The combined German-Spanish action against Gibraltar (Opera­
tion Felix) was to have taken place during this period. It 
was to have been a quick and a secondary engagement, invol­
ving neither large numbers of troops nor much time. 
Unfortunately, for the Germans, it was based on the concept 
of Spanish co-operation, and was stillborn because that 
6 
co-operation was not forthcoming. With the opening of the 
It has been held by some writers (Ian Colvin, Chief 
of Intellijgence; Karl Heinz Abshagen, Panaris; Anthony 
Martienssen, Hitler and His Admirals; Milton Shulman, Defeat 
in the West) that Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, Chief of the 
German Military Intelligence (Abwehr). played a very great 
role in keeping Spain out of the war and to a high degree 
was responsible for the tempering of Nazi pressure on Spain 
to assume a belligerent status and join the Axis war cause. 
The career of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris is one of shadows, 
for he was a secretive man who was simultaneously fighting 
the Russian, British and American secret services, the 
infringements on his organization by the Nazi Party 
Intelligence Service (Sicherheitsdienst), and the Gestapo 
who were interested in his alleged anti-Nazi and treasonable 
activities. Some claim (lan Colvin for one) that he was an 
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unofficial agent for the British Secret Service. Others 
hold that he was a pessemistic man who merely had a weather 
eye out for the future turn of events and the best he could 
personally make out of them for no other than Wilhelm 
Canaris. Paul Leverkuehn, author of German Military 
Intelligence, was an immediate subordinate of Canaris in 
the Abwehr. He holds that the Admiral had no knowledge 
what-so-ever of illegal peace negotiations with the Allies 
through his organization, nor did he become a willing 
conspirator against Hitler's life and regime in what is 
known as the 20 July plot. Gerald Reitlinger, in his work 
The SS, Alibi of a Nation, maintains that Canaris was a good 
friend of the mass-murderer, Reinhard Heydrich, and notes 
that it was Canaris who gave the impassioned funeral oration 
for Heydrich after his assassination by Czechoslovak partisans, 
Canaris called Heydrich "his true friend and a great man." 
(See Reitlinger p. 216; also Abshagen p. 149). Other writers, 
C onstatine FitzGibbon for one July) make Canaris out 
as a loyal Christian and a decent fellow, if not an active 
conspirator against the Nazi regime. Thus, the picture and 
role of Wilhelm Canaris are shadowy, for he was a man skilled 
in keeping in the shadows. But most writers agree that 
Canaris did coach Franco before the Hendaye Conference, and 
give the Caudillo an idea of what Hitler would demand and 
how best to avoid those demands, yet keep the Fuehrer from 
becoming too enraged. It appears that Canaris did much to 
present the worst possible picture to the German High Command 
of Spanish military ability and economic strength, thereby 
+ tli-x -P'-P tt T\ ^ ^ ̂  kjpcAXJLx wxx vxxo Jixuuxk* y o c? c v/xxdpucx x/« uuiu X 
seems that Canaris* only interest in Spain; was to keep it 
neutral, to prevent its being ravaged by the war. After the 
Hendaye Conference, and especially after the opening of the 
Eastern offensive, it appears that Canaris had little or no 
interest in protecting Spain, for there was little danger 
to the "^ungrateful" Sjpanish from the Germans. Rather, 
according to most reports, Canaris was active in Spain before 
the Hendaye Conference in an effort to keep Spain neutral. 
This is an interesting line of investigation, but it is 
outside the bounds of this thesis. Why Spain remained 
neutral is another question, a question that cannot be 
accurately answered until Madrid opens its archives. What is 
of importance is that the Abwehr and Admiral Canaris had no 
direct role in preventing a German invasion of Spain, although 
it cannot be denied that his pessimistic reports on the 
conditions in Spain must have had some indirect effect on the 
later thinking of the Fuehrer and the Wehrmacht. To assess 
that indirect effect is obviously impossible. The reports 
by Canaris are included verbatim in Chapter I, 
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Balkan war during this period, and the invasion of Russia 
immediately thereafter, the Wehrmacht was in no position 
in terms of economy of forces to engage in a. costly 
peninsular campaign. On top of all this, there was the 
African "holding action,"' a major campaign that the 
Wehrmacht found impossible to supply with even minimum 
necessities, such as fuel. In the face of the weakening 
economy of forces on the German side, an invasion of the 
Iberian peninsula during the period 1940-42 was out of the 
question. 
By the end of 1942, as has been shown, the German 
army had suffered through its first catastrophic winter in 
Russia, had all but lost North Africa, and had suffered 
tremendous defeats at sea and in the air. Yet no victorious 
"Battle of Decision" had been fought. The Russians, the 
British and the Americans were fighting with ever growing 
strength. The strength of the Wehrmacht was ebbing, and 
it had grown weak. The Moloch of Stalingrad was soon to cost 
the Wehrmacht 600,000 troops, and can be said to have been 
one of the major turning points of the war. It was the 
highpoint of the Russian campaign, it was the "Battle of 
Decision," and it ended in disaster. After that awful 
winter of 1942-43, Germany was never again to possess the 
opportunity, let alone the ability, for the opening of a 
new front. It could not even hold those upon which it was 
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forced to fight. Desperate endeavors, such as the air-lift 
of troops to Tunis in November, 1942, were rare exceptions. 
That air-lift was the enervated gesture of a dying Afrika 
Korps. At any rate, the few thousand troops so painfully 
gathered and air-lifted to Tunis could never have launched 
an invasion of Spain through the Pyrenees, much less have 
sustained it. 
Hans Speidel, Rommel's Chief of Staff in Europe, 
wrote in his work Invasion 1944; "By the year 1943 Germany 
had passed the peak of her military strength. Disintegra­
tion was spreading through her political leadership and her 
7 
military command." Rommel himself wrote regarding Africa; 
8 
•*No longer could we carry the burden of three fronts." 
He went on to point out that in 1944 the Russians had 
broken through the lines to the east, and the Allies had 
invaded the west. In 1944 only the front in Italy was 
holding, and that at tremendous costs in men and materiel, 
Rommel wrote that only with great difficulty and by using 
their last reserves had the Wehrmacht been able to impro­
vise new lines, both east and west. He then concluded his 
writings with that now famous phrase: "The sky over Germany 
9 
has grown very dark," 
T 
Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944 (Chicagoj Henry Regnery, 
1950), p. 3, 
®Rommel, 524, 
^Ibid, 
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Thus it was that from June, 1940, until the end of 
the war the Economy of Forces prohibited any movement by 
the Wehrmacht into Spain and Portugal. There were simply 
not enough men, guns, tracked vehicles, fuel stores, planes, 
railway engines, naval craft, etc., to allow the German 
military to open a new and what promised to be a very costly 
front in an area that would in no event (according to 
Hitler) give the needed "Battle of Decision." As the 
months passed, the supplies, the men, the materiels grew 
ever shorter, and the war ever more terrible. 
And then of course, there was the question of timing. 
There never arose a lull, a period during which the invasion 
could have been launched. Operation Sea Lion, the build-up 
for Operation Barbarossa, the Balkan war, the North African 
campaign, the Italian defection, the partisan wars in 
Yugoslavia, and so on, always prohibited any unnecessary 
engagement. The holocaust of the Eastern Front would have 
in itself been enough to make the opening of another front, 
especially in the West, insane. But Hitler had much more 
to deal with than the Eastern Front, and at no time was he 
bothered with a surplus of troops or supplies during a 
"slack period." There were no slack periods! 
The Economy of Forces may be judged the prime reason 
for the failure of Hitler and the Wehrmacht to invade Spain 
and Portugal. One, of course, cannot disregard the other 
factors which affected the problem and resulted in the 
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decision not to launch an invasion. But in terms of 
material realities, and for the moment disregarding the 
personal and political feelings of Hitler toward the Spanish, 
the Economy of Forces still stands as the single great 
explanation of the German decision not to invade, or what 
is more, of Hitler's refusal to even consider such a thing. 
Field Marshal von Manstein gave what is perhaps the best 
! 
precis of this factor; 
The capture of Gibraltar could only have been 
carried out with Spanish consent—which was in 
fact never obtained—or by bringing pressure 
to bear on the Spaniards. Either course would 
have meant the end of Spanish neutrality. The 
Reich would have been left with no other choice 
than to take over—with or without the agreement 
of Madrid and Lisbon—the protection of the whole 
Iberian coastline,, as well as to guarantee the 
supply of that area. Resistance could have been 
expected from both countries—'most of all from 
Portugal, who would have seen her colonies Immedi-
atelv ocGunied bv Eneland. Anvhow. the Iberlam 
- - 4/ ^ ^ ^ ^ - - ? - _ 
peninsula would have swallowed a considerable 
portion of the German Army in the long run, and 
the repercussions in the U. S. A. and Latin 
America to a forcible occupation of Spain and 
Portugal could have been disastrous. 
It is little wonder that Hitler looked aghast at an Iberian 
war. 
Who can say what the results would have been had he 
done otherwise; had he not invaded the USSR but rather 
followed the advice of Goering and Raeder in 1940"=41, had 
he struck south and west through Spain and then across 
^®Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, 
edited and translated by Anthony G. Powell (London; Methuen, 
1958), p. 160-61. 
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North Africa? A great single campaign of lightning speed 
which would have closed the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, 
seized Suez from the weak British force there, and then 
swept through the poorly defended Near East to link with 
the Japanese somewhere in Afganistan or India. The reflec­
tions of Field Marshal Rommel would seem to be particularly 
apt in this regard: 
Victory in battle—save where it is brought 
about by sheer weight of numbers, and omitting 
all questions of the courage of the troops en~ 
gaged—never comes solely as the result of the 
victor's planning. It is not only the merits 
of the victor that decide the issue, but also 
the mistakes on the part of the vanquished, 
^^Rommel, 519 
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